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Work-For-Hire and the Moral Right Dilemma in 
the European Community: A U.s. Perspectivet 
Robert A. J acobs* 
INTRODUCTION 
For some copyright owners, the 1992 buzz words of "freedom 
of movement" are a cruel joke. Despite the drive toward a barrier-
free common market within the European Community (EC), 
copyright owners continue to face the unique obstacles created 
by moral right principles. These principles, in essence, give an 
author "the right to publish his work as he sees fit, and to prevent 
its injury or mutilation."1 Since these rights generally only accrue 
to the creator of a work,2 persons who acquire interests in a 
copyrighted work by means other than creation must consider 
whether their use of a work could violate its creator's moral right. 
The burden of assessing potential moral right claims falls partic-
ularly on copyright licensees, assignees, and those who own copy-
right interests in works made for hire. While this class of owners 
as a whole faces the same moral right dilemma in the EC, recent 
developments in the work-for-hire context3 best illustrate the 
extent to which the international copyright community continues 
to misconstrue national approaches to copyright ownership and 
moral right. 
t Copyright © 1993 Robert A. Jacobs. This Article is an entry in the 1992 ASCAP 
Nathan Burken National Competition. The author wishes to thank Professor Lawrence 
A. Sullivan and Professor Robert C. Lind for their helpful comments. 
* J.D. (cum laude), Southwestern University School of Law. Mr. Jacobs is currently a 
law clerk for Judge Gregory Carman of the United States Court of International Trade 
in New York City. 
I MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (1st ed. 1989). 
2Id. at 254 (describing moral right as "an inalienable, natural right and an extension 
of the artist's personality"). 
3 During the summer of 1991, John Huston's heirs successfully asserted the director's 
moral right to enjoin the televised broadcast of a colorized version of the film "Asphalt 
Jungle." Judgment of May 28, 1991 (Huston v. La Cinq), Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 
89-19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File. The French Supreme Court 
granted the injunction despite the fact that M.G.M. had acquired the film's original 
copyright as a work-for-hire and validly transferred its interest to Turner Broadcasting. 
Id. 
29 
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The laws of several EC Member States create problems for 
Americans4 who wish to exploit works made for hire in the EC.5 
Foremost among these problems is the disparate treatment that 
Member States accord to authors whose status as author does not 
stem from creating a copyrighted work, but from the legal fiction 
supplied by work-for-hire rules. 6 This legal fiction posits that 
when a creator constructs a copyrightable work in the context of 
certain employment relationships, authorship vests in the person 
for whom the creator works. 7 
The dilemma posed by these divergent approaches was played 
out most recently in the French Supreme Court decision, Huston 
v. La Cinq.8 In Huston, John Huston's heirs sought and obtained 
an injunction barring the broadcast of the colorized version of 
the film "Asphalt Jungle."9 Despite the fact that Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios owned the original copyright in the film,lo the 
French High Court ruled that under French copyright law the 
heirs possessed the separate moral rights of paternity11 and 
4 For purposes of this article, "Americans" refers to those natural persons, business 
entities, and foreign copyright registrants that hold a copyright under U.S. law. 
s 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), in relevant part, defines "work made for hire," as: 
Id. 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; 
or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a 
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a 
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, 
as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree 
in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work 
made for hire. 
6 Cf ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 41-42 
(I 978)(contrasting the pro-employer work-for-hire rules in the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands with the pro-employee rules in Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, and Italy). 
7 Cf LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 132 (distinguishing between "works created as part of 
one's job" and "works created by individual authors on their own motivation" to explain 
the work-for-hire doctrine). 
8 Judgment of May 28, 1991 (Huston v. La Cinq), Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-
19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File. 
9Id. 
10 Under U.S. copyright law, once an author properly "fixes" a work of sufficient 
creativity, she attains a copyright. "A copyright consists of a bundle of exclusive rights 
which empowers the copyright owner to exclude others from certain uses of his work." 
LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 203. Therefore, once Huston completed the film and M.G.M. 
complied with the necessary copyright formalities, the studio acquired the five exclusive 
rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and display in the film. 
II The right of paternity enables an author to indicate her position as the author of a 
work in disseminating that work. Robert Plaisant, France, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
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integrityl2 that the colorized film violated. 13 Even assuming Hus-
ton purported to transfer or waive his moral right by contract, 
French law, and the law of eight other EC Member States, would 
invalidate such contractual efforts.14 Despite the warm reception 
Huston's heirs received in France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
and the Netherlands would not recognize their claimed moral 
right subsequent to a contractual transfer or waiver. IS 
LAW AND PRACTICE 81 (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1991). This article refers to the 
right of paternity and the right of attribution interchangeably. 
12 In general, the right of integrity gives each author the right to prohibit a copyright 
transferee and holders of the copyrighted work from modifying the author's work. 
13 Judgment of May 28, 1991 (Huston v. La Cinq), Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-
19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File. 
14 Belgian law categorically forbids alienation of moral right interests. See Jan Corbet, 
Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 16; see also 
Denmark Law No. 158 of 1961 on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, ch. 1 § 3 
(1977 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, at Denmark (U.N. 
Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Denmark Copyright Law] 
(author cannot waive rights of paternity and integrity); France Law No. 57-298 on 
Literary and Artistic Property, art. 6 (1985 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREA-
TIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at France [hereinafter French Copyright Law] (describing the 
moral right of paternity and integrity as "perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible"); 
Federal Republic of Germany Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights (1985 text), 
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at Germany [herinafter 
German Copyright Law]; Adolph Dietz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 91 (German copyright law impliedly recognizes some waiver 
of moral right but maintains a presumption against it); Greek Law on Literary Property, 
art. 1 (1944 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at 
Greece [hereinafter Greek Copyright Law]; George Koumantos, Greece, in INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 30 [hereinafter Koumantos] (Greek 
copyright prohibits authors from transferring moral right but allows for limited waiver); 
Italy Law No. 633 of Apr. 22, 1941, for the Protection of Copyright and Other Rights 
Connected with the Exercise Thereof, art. 22 (1981 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS 
AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at Italy [hereinafter Italian Copyright Law] (rights 
of paternity and integrity are inalienable); Luxembourg Copyright Law of Mar. 29, 1972, 
art. 9 (1972 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at 
Luxembourg [hereinafter Luxembourg Copyright Law] (author retains right of paternity 
and integrity after transfer of author's economic rights); Portugal Code of Copyright and 
Related Rights, art. 56 (1)-(2) (1985 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF 
THE WORLD, supra, at Portugal [hereinafter Portugal Copyright Law] (characterizing the 
moral right of paternity and integrity as "perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible"); 
Spanish Law on Intellectual Property, art. 14 (1987 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS 
AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at Spain [hereinafter Spanish Copyright Law] (la-
belling moral rights as "unrenounceable and inalienable"). 
15 See United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, § 87(2) (1988 text), 
reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 14, at United 
Kingdom [hereinafter United Kingdom CDPA] (authors may waive their moral right in 
a signed writing but cannot transfer it); Ireland Act to Make New Provision in Respect 
of Copyright and Related Matters, in Substitution for the Provisions of Parts VI and VII 
of the Industrial and Commercial Property (Protection) Act, 1927, and Other Enactments 
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The conflict Huston addressed illustrates a significant inconsis-
tency in EC copyright law, which greatly impacts the U.S. work-
for-hire doctrine. 16 Copyright laws in the EC and those of the 
United States represent two different copyright traditions-the 
civil law dualistic system and the common law monistic system. 
The dualistic system consists of "two essential components, each 
with a different nature: moral right and economic right."17 On 
the one hand, "[m]oral right is a right of personality that ... 
protect[s] the person of the author."18 The right enables an au-
thor "to maintain respect for his work and, thereby, for his rep-
utation. This right ... is perpetual [and] inalienable."19 On the 
other hand, "[t]he economic component of copyright is the right 
to exploit a work and draw profits from it ... [and] is by nature 
transferable. "20 
Under the monistic system, copyright as a whole safeguards 
"both the financial and intellectual interests of the author."21 The 
monistic structure, unlike the dualistic structure, views authors' 
financial and intellectual interests as complimentary and there-
fore permits authors to profit from both.22 Thus, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands-all of whom adhere to 
the monistic system-allow authors to transfer or waive their 
moral right.23 The dualistic system of all other EC civil law coun-
tries affects U.S. work-for-hire owners most severely. 
Relating Thereto, and to Provide for Matters Connected With the Matters Aforesaid, 
§ 10 (1963 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at 
Ireland [hereinafter Ireland Copyright Act) (employer and principal acquire copyright 
works made in the course of employment or under contract and therefore preclude moral 
right claims by creator; and, moral right is subject to waiver); Netherlands Law Concerning 
the New Regulation of Copyright, art. 25 (1985 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND 
TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra, at Netherlands [hereinafter Netherlands Copyright Law) 
(author may waive right to paternity, integrity, and honor). These rules indicate that 
British, Irish, and Dutch work-for-hire copyright holders face the same problems as their 
American counterparts. 
16 In the United States, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a)-(b) (1988) govern the work-for-hire 
doctrine. They set forth, respectively, the statutory definition of the work-for-hire doctrine 
and guidelines for ownership of works satisfying the statutory definition. 
17 Plaisant, supra note 11, at 11-12 (describing the French dualistic system). 
18Id. at 12. 
19/d. 
2°Id. 
21 DIETZ, supra note 6, at 47. 
22Id. ("The exclusive right of use granted to the author serves his intellectual interests, 
too, and the personal rights granted to him also serve his financial interests."). 
23 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra part II.B.2.a-c. 
1993] WORK-FoR-HIRE IN THE EC 33 
Americans who wish to market a work made for hire in most 
EC civil law countries must consider the potential problems a 
moral right challenge would pose to the economic exploitation 
of the work.24 When contracting for the work, Americans need 
to assess the contours of the work-for-hire doctrine within each 
EC Member State and to account for any limitation a particular 
Member State's laws may impose. Huston suggests moral right is 
such a limitation because it casts a shadow over future economic 
exploitation of a work-for-hire. 
Whether moral right poses any threat at all depends on how 
an EC Member State defines authorship for copyright purposes. 
To the extent a Member State defines "author" in the work-for-
hire context in the same manner as U.S. law,25 U.S. firms can 
expect the same treatment in that Member State as they would 
receive in the United States. Because moral rights attach to the 
author in the EC,26 if the law of an EC Member State attributes 
24 This article does not address moral right in the United States. Nonetheless, it should 
be noted that moral right also creates obstacles in the United States. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. 
§ 106A (Supp. 1991)(creating the moral right of attribution and integrity in authors of 
works of visual art); Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (West Supp. 1988)(establishing a right of 
paternity and integrity in authors of works of fine art); see also Gilliam v. American 
Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976)(holding that defendant's mutilation of 
plaintiff's work-a classic moral right of integrity violation-infringed plaintiff's copy-
right since it constituted an unauthorized derivative work). For a more complete discussion 
of U.S. statutory and common law moral right provisions, see Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright 
and Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 V AND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1985). See also 
Jack A. Cline, Comment, Moral Rights: The Long and Winding Road Toward Recognition, 14 
NOVA L. REV. 435 (1990). 
25 17 U .S.C. § 201(b) (1988) defines "author" in the work-for-hire context as "the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared .... " In Community for 
Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid, the Supreme Court further refined § 201(b)'s defi-
nition when it held that traditional agency principles will determine whether a work is 
one that an employee prepared in the scope of his or her employment. 490 U.S. 730, 
750-51 (1989). The Court indicated a need to focus on "the hiring party's right to control 
the manner and means by which the product is accomplished." Id. at 751. The Court also 
listed the following factors to guide the inquiry: 
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of 
the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the 
hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the 
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the 
method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; 
whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether 
the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax 
treatment of the hired party. 
/d. at 751-52 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
26 The copyright laws of all EC Member States protect the authors of works. DIETZ, 
supra note 6, at 41. In general, the Member States apply the term "author" to the natural 
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authorship to the employer in an employer-employee relationship 
or to the principal in a principal-independent contractor rela-
tionship, then the creator of the work-the employee or the 
independent contractor-lacks a legal basis to object to the work's 
exploitation.27 The question of authorship, therefore, is central 
to the work-for-hire quandary. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine how each EC Member 
State defines authorship for work-for-hire purposes and to dem-
onstrate that each State's approach is consistent with broader EC 
and international copyright principles. Part I outlines the inter-
national copyright norms that affect the work-for-hire doctrine. 
Part II addresses the EC policies that impact national copyright 
law and how each EC Member State approaches the work-for-
hire issue. Part III explores the extent to which harmonization 
or adoption of a private choice of law rule could help resolve the 
conflict created by the States' divergent approaches. Despite the 
difficulties EC work-for-hire rules present, this Article concludes 
that EC rules should remain the same because they reflect sub-
stantial cultural values that Member States should not be forced 
to sacrifice. 
I. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT NORMS 
The Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions greatly affect 
the work-for-hire doctrine in the EC. Their impact stems from 
the reciprocity principle on which they both operate. This prin-
ciple requires, in part, that all Member States apply their own 
national copyright law to protect a work that another Member 
State protects under its own law.28 Because EC national laws differ 
with respect to the work-for-hire doctrine,29 reciprocity between 
EC Member States can produce anomalous results. The Berne 
and Universal Copyright Conventions require separate consid-
eration because each plays such an integral role in resolving 
copyright problems between two or more countries. 
person or persons responsible for creating the work. Id. But see infra text accompanying 
note 243. 
27 See discussion infra part II.C. 
28 See infra notes 35, 69 and accompanying text. 
29 See discussion infra part II.B.1-2. 
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A. The Berne Convention 
1. An Overview 
The Berne Convention establishes a Union dedicated to pro-
tecting authors' rights in their literary and artistic works. 3D Since 
its inception in 1886, the Berne Convention has provided the 
basic framework for international copyright relations. 31 It rep-
resents the first broad-based multilateral copyright convention,32 
and a "limited kind of international copyright code."33 
The Berne Convention applies broadly and grants national 
legislatures wide latitude to fashion their own protective schemes. 
It applies to all "'literary and artistic works' ... indud[ing] every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever 
may be the mode or form of its expression."34 In essence, the 
Berne Convention requires its signatories to protect the published 
or unpublished works of an author of another Member State.35 
Member States must also protect works of non-Member State 
nationals who publish their works first in a Member State or who 
publish their works simultaneously in a non-Member State and a 
Member State.36 The Berne Convention contemplates protection 
for a minimum term of life plus fifty years,37 or, in the case of 
anonymous or pseudonymous works, fifty years from publica-
tion.38 Apart from the moral right provision,39 the Berne Con-
30 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
828 V.N.T.S. 221 (revised in 1908, 1928, 1967, 1971) art. 1 [hereinafter Berne Convention) 
(Paris text). 
31 Stephen J. Strauss, Don't Be Burned By Berne: A Guide to the Changes in the Copyright 
Laws as a Result of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 71 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 
374, 374 (1989). For an in-depth discussion of the Berne Convention's historic origins, 
see generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987). 
32 RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 39. 
33 Id. at 41. 
34 Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 2(1). 
35Id. at art. 3(1)(a). 
36 Id. at art. 3(1)(b). 
37Id. at art. 7(1). 
38Id. at art. 7(3). 
39Id. at art. 6bis. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention contains the moral right provision: 
(I) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer 
of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation. 
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vention does not require recognition of rights beyond those al-
ready established by U.S. copyright law.4o 
Although the Berne Union has achieved significant success,41 
an ideological debate over the proper scope of author's rights has 
persisted since the Union's formation.42 Because the work-for-
hire doctrine inverts the concept of "creator as author" to "em-
ployer or principal as author," the doctrine is averse to many 
signatories' notions of author's rights. Those countries who feel 
that author's rights are strictly personal are offended by the 
prospect that one who pays for a creator's work in the course of 
employment or pursuant to contract acquires the copyright in 
that work. The Berne Convention has approached these author-
ship issues equivocally and appears to leave them to national 
legislatures to resolve. 
2. Authorship Under the Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention does not define the term "author."43 
Instead, the Berne Convention leaves the concept to the ordinary 
meaning it has in each signatory. In the United States, the law 
describes "author" as "[0 ]ne who produces, by his own intellectual 
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding para-
graph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the 
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorised 
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those 
countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to 
this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all 
the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these 
rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained. 
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed. 
Id. 
40 Cf LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 350. "Berne ... is not as extensive as American law. For 
example, Berne is silent on distribution and display rights, both of which are specifically 
provided for under American law." Id. 
41 Eighty-four nations have acceded to the Berne Union since its formation in 1886. 
For a list of nations which were parties to the Berne Convention as of 1990, see generally 
Copyright, Monthly Review of the World Intellectual Property OrganiUltion, Jan. 1990 [herein-
after WIPOj. The United States joined the Berne Union in 1988. See The Berne Conven-
tion Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 301,401-02,404-08,801 (1988)). For an in-depth 
discussion of the Berne Convention's effect in the United States, see David Nimmer, The 
Impact of Berne on United States Copyright Law, 8 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 27 (1989). 
42 One commentator has linked the problem to achieving a consensus between nations 
about what constitutes "the author's natural right of property in his works." RICKETSON, 
supra note 31, at 40. 
43Id. at 158. 
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labor applied to the materials of his composition, an arrangement 
or compilation new in itself."44 This description confers author-
ship status on creators of intellectual works. All Berne Union 
countries accept the "creator as author" equation.45 Some Berne 
countries, however, accept the equation for some purposes and 
reject it for others.46 In general, countries that unconditionally 
adhere to the "creator as author" concept do so on the premise 
that authors can only be natural persons. 
Indeed, one commentator has asserted that the Berne Conven-
tion intended to adopt the "only natural persons" approachY 
This commentator bases his argument on four points. First, the 
reference in the Berne Convention's preamble and article 1, re-
garding "the need to protect the 'rights of authors in their literary, 
and artistic works,'" alludes to personal, not corporate, rights.48 
Second, because the Berne Convention makes the general term 
of protection dependent upon the life of the author plus fifty 
years, the term could not apply to corporate entities which may 
have an indeterminate existence.49 Third, the fact that article 
14bis makes a special allowance for legal systems that permit the 
author of cinematographic works to be a corporate person "con-
firms the existence of the general rule that only natural persons 
can be authors."5o Fourth, numerous other conventions specifi-
cally address works whose creators are not their authors and 
whose authors are not natural persons; this is further evidence 
that the Berne Convention has adopted a general rule that only 
natural persons can be authors. 51 
Although this argument highlights some important facets of 
the Berne Convention, it does not persuasively show that the 
Convention strictly follows the "creator as author" equation. 52 
44 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 168 (4th ed. 1968). Of course, for copyright purposes, 17 
U.S.C. § 201(b)(l988) transforms this traditional definition. See supra note 25. 
45 RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 158. 
46 Compare United Kingdom CDPA, supra note 15, § 9 ("In this Part 'author,' in relation 
to a work, means the person who creates it") with id. §§ I 1 (l)-(2)("The author of a work 
is the first owner of any copyright in it, subject to the following provisions. Where a 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is made by an employee in the course of his 
employment, his employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work .... "). 
47 See RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 159. 
48Id. 
49 Id. 
50Id. 
51Id. 
52 In fact, the argument appears to overlook the strongest basis for finding that the 
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Initially, the mere fact that the Berne Convention refers to "au-
thors' rights"53 does not necessarily exclude non-natural persons. 
A brief reference to U.S. copyright law supports this inference. 
In the United States, the Constitution vests Congress with the 
authority "[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries."54 The 
meaning of "authors" in this context is as open-ended as "au-
thors" in the Berne Convention context. Accordingly, when Con-
gress amended the copyright laws in 1909 and 1976 to codify the 
work-for-hire doctrine, it interpreted "authors" to include both 
natural and non-natural persons. 55 This interpretation is as plau-
sible as construing the Berne Convention's "authors" to include 
only natural persons. Thus, the Berne Convention's language may 
not indicate that it protects only natural persons. 
There is no conclusive proof that the Berne Convention applies 
only to natural persons. Although non-natural persons have in-
determinate existences, a potentially indefinite lifespan alone 
does not preclude non-natural persons from obtaining copyright 
protection. For example, under the indeterminate existence ar-
gument, the Berne Convention would not apply to anonymous 
or pseudonymous works because by definition these works have 
no author whose life could measure the term of copyright pro-
tection. The Berne Convention itself refutes this position since it 
fixes the term of protection for anonymous and pseudonymous 
works to fifty years. 56 Furthermore, like the Berne Convention's 
scheme for anonymous and pseudonymous works, signatories 
may establish methods for protecting other kinds of works whose 
Berne Convention generally follows a "creator as author rule" and does not protect non-
natural authors. This basis is the character of the Berne Convention's adherents. That is, 
of the eighty-four nations who had become signatories of the Berne Convention as of 
1990, the overwhelming majority follow the civil law tradition of limiting initial copyright 
ownership to creators. See WIPO, supra note 41. 
53 See Berne Convention, supra note 30, at pmbl. (Union countries "animated" by desire 
to "protect ... the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works"); see also id. at art. 
1 ("The countries to which this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection 
of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works."). 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
55 See 17 U .S.C. § 26 (1909 Act)("the word author shall include an employer in the case 
of works made for hire"); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988) (,,[T]he employer or other 
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this 
title .... "). 
56 Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 7(3). 
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authors are non-natural persons. For example, the United States 
limits copyright protection of works made for hire to a set number 
of years.57 The Berne Convention and U.S. provisions demon-
strate the potential to protect non-natural persons and more 
significantly, the proposition that the Berne Convention itself 
contemplates such protection. 
The third point favoring a "natural persons only" interpreta-
tion incorrectly assumes that because the Berne Convention relies 
on national legislation for copyright ownership in cinemato-
graphic works, the Berne Convention makes a "special allowance" 
for corporate ownership. 58 The Berne Convention's willingness 
to allow national legislatures to define a class of works reflects a 
policy of deference to national legislatures in particularly complex 
areas of intellectual creation such as the "general rule" that only 
natural persons can be authors. Copyright policy decisions are 
very difficult, given the variety of intellectual contributions a 
cinematographic work typically contains, and the nature of the 
cinematographic industry in general. In view of the complexities 
of this industry, the Berne Convention's special allowance for 
corporate ownership does no more than leave difficult decisions 
to the Union Members. 
Finally, the fact that other conventions address non-natural 
creators does not prove that the Berne Convention establishes a 
general rule that only natural persons can be authors. 59 The 
Berne Convention represents more than a century of negotiation 
to develop norms for the international copyright community. 
During this period various technologies developed which neces-
sitate separate treatment. While the conventions addressing these 
new technologies may provide for non-natural creators, the 
Berne Convention's failure to make such provisions does not 
indicate that the Berne Convention implicitly denies that non-
57 For works made for hire created on or after January 1, 1978, the term of protection 
lasts seventy-five years after publication, or one hundred years after creation, whichever 
is shorter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988). The same duration applies to works made for hire 
created before January 1, 1978, but not published or registered. 17 U .S.C. § 303 (1988). 
58 Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 14bis(2)(a). Article 14bis(2)(a) states: "Own-
ership of copyright in a cinematographic work shall be a matter for legislation in a country 
where protection is claimed." [d. 
59 To make this point Ricketson refers to the International Convention for the Protec-
tion of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome 
Convention) 1961 and the Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms 
against Unauthorised Duplication of their Phonograms (Geneva, 1971). RICKETSON, supra 
note 31, at 159 n.7. 
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natural persons may be creators. Like any international conven-
tion, the Berne Convention cannot effectively treat all technolo-
gies that implicate copyright. In short, the Berne Convention 
neither creates a per se rule against non-natural creators nor 
explicitly grants such creators its protection.60 
3. Work-for-Hire Under the Berne Convention 
Just as the Berne Convention omits any definition of "author," 
it also does not explicitly address the work-for-hire doctrine. 61 
Furthermore, the reasons advanced to explain why the Berne 
Convention rejects work-for-hire are similar to the reasons why 
it does not recognize non-natural authors, with one exception.62 
60 Admittedly, the Berne Convention's moral right provisions clouds the authorship 
issue. See Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 6bis (moral right). However, under the 
law of a few EC Member States and the United States, waiver or transfer of moral right 
and/or the work-for-hire doctrine obviate the concern that moral right may potentially 
raise. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
Nonetheless, the questions of who created the work, who a work's author is, and who 
owns the work's copyright are separate and distinct. For example, a party may own a 
work's copyright without being the work's author. Under the Berne Convention, the 
author always retains a moral right in the work and can effectively limit the owner's 
exercise of her exclusive rights in the work. Alternatively, if the owner were also the 
author because the law vested the original copyright in her (as under the work-for-hire 
doctrine), the creator would no longer have any moral right by which she could limit the 
owner's exclusive rights in the work. These two examples illustrate that whomever the 
law recognizes as author acquires the original and complete copyright. This copyright 
includes both moral and economic rights in the work. In the final analysis, moral right is 
collateral to the issue of authorship since authorship is a condition precedent to acquiring 
moral right. 
61 However, article 15(2) implicitly recognizes the doctrine since it addresses corporate 
authorship of a cinematographic work: "The person or body corporate whose name 
appears on a cinematographic work in the usual manner shall, in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, be presumed to be the maker of the said work." Berne Convention, supra 
note 30, at art. 15(2). Corporate authorship can only arise by treating the corporation as 
author. A corporation, in turn, can only be an author through its employees, and only 
by virtue of work-for-hire principles. Hence, article 15(2) incorporates work-for-hire, 
albeit implicitly, only in the context of cinematographic works. 
62 See RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 902-03: "[Als a general matter, Union countries 
should not extend the status of 'author' to persons or entities who are clearly not the real 
creators of works." (emphasis added). Granting authorship status to non-creators contra-
venes the Convention for the following reasons: 
(1) While the term "author" is not defined in the Convention, the requirement 
of intellectual creation which is implicit in article 2(1) indicates that this must be 
the person who is the actual creator of a work. 
(2) While there is nothing which expressly requires an author to be a natural 
person, this seems confirmed by the requirements with respect to duration and 
the protection of moral rights. The fact that there is a special provision dealing 
with cinematographic works also supports this view. 
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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This exception embodies a concern shared most frequently in 
continental Europe that authors occupy weaker bargaining posi-
tions vis-a.-vis their employers, principals, and the general pub-
lic.63 As this article demonstrates,64 this concern explains the split 
among EC Member States over adopting a full-fledged work-for-
hire rule that vests employers with both economic and moral 
right copyright protection. 
In its broad context, the Berne Convention lends little support 
to work-for-hire. First, the Berne Convention only implicitly rec-
ognizes this doctrine in the context of cinematographic works.65 
Second, the Berne Convention's moral right provision places a 
significant stumbling block between an employee's work and an 
employer. Moreover, because the Berne Convention never affir-
matively recognizes contractual waiver or transfer of moral right, 
it creates the same morass the French Supreme Court addressed 
in Huston v. La Cinq.66 Overall, the Berne Convention furthers 
the dual copyright notions of separate economic and moral rights, 
and forgoes committing to the monistic view that copyright 
should only protect authors' commercial interests "for limited 
times."67 
B. The Universal Copyright Convention 
1. An Overview 
The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), along with the 
Berne Convention, is one of the principal international treaties 
63 Cf Eric H. Smith, Copyright Developments Under European Unification, Originally pre-
sented to AIPLA 1991 Midwinter Institute (Jan. 23-26, 1991), reprinted in CREATION, 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: WHO CALLS THE SHOTS HERE AND ABROAD? at 4, redistributed 
to University of Southern California Entertainment Law Institute (Apr. 27, 1991) [here-
inafter CREATION, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL]. "[T]he bias toward authors' rights on the 
Continent reflects itself in a marked mixed tendency of government to want to acknowl-
edge, and correct through legislation, what is perceived as the weaker bargaining power 
of the author .... " Id. It is this facet of continental thinking that militates against 
harmonization of the work-for-hire doctrine in the EC and that supports this article's 
thesis. 
64 See discussion infra part IIl.A-B. 
65 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
66 Judgment of May 28, 1991 (Huston v. La Cinq), Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-
19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File. 
67 U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The monistic view opposes the dualistic view that prevails 
throughout continental Europe and in virtually all civil law countries. "The dualistic 
concept of copyright assumes that the moral rights (droits moraux) and the property 
rights (droits pecuniares) regulated separately in the law are independent of one another, 
and can therefore also have different legal outcomes." DIETZ, supra note 6, at 67. See id. 
at 67-68 for a more complete comparison of the dualistic and monistic copyright systems. 
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governing international copyright law.68 Like the Berne Conven-
tion, the UCC relies on a policy of reciprocal national treatment. 69 
But, unlike the Berne Convention, it focuses on protecting au-
thors' economic rights and does not explicitly address moral 
right. 70 It does, however, tacitly approve of Contracting States 
adopting moral right under certain conditions.7 ! Undoubtedly, 
the UCC's most significant departure from the Berne Convention 
is in the copyright formalities it imposes. 
The UCC's formalities arose from the Convention's chief spon-
sor, the United States. The Convention resulted from the U.S. 
initiative in response to the Berne Convention.72 The United 
68 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 344. This article does not discuss several other international 
copyright treaties. These other treaties include the following: The International Conven-
tion for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Or-
ganizations (Rome Convention) (1961); The Convention for the Protection of Producers 
of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms (Phonograms 
Convention) (Geneva, 1971); The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (Satellites Convention) (Brussels, 1974); The 
European Agreement Concerning Programme Exchanges by Means of Television Films 
(Paris, 1958); The European Agreement for the Prevention of Broadcasts Transmitted 
from Stations Outside National Territories (Strasbourg, 1965); and, The European Agree-
ment and Protocol on the Protection of Television Broadcasts (Strasbourg, 1960 & 1965). 
While these treaties impact EC copyright law, their specific subject matter focus removes 
them from the ambit of this article's discussion. 
69 The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) applies its national protection as follows: 
1. Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first pub-
lished in that State shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection 
as that other State accords to works of its nationals first published in its own 
territory, as well as the protection specially granted by this Convention. 
2. Unpublished works of nationals of each Contracting State shall enjoy in 
each other Contracting State the same protection as that other State accords to 
unpublished works of its own nationals, as well as the protection specially granted 
by this Convention. 
Universal Copyright Convention, art. II, Sept. 6, 1952,6 U.S.T. 2731, reprinted in COpy-
RIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 14, Supp. 1972, Item B-1, at 1 
(Paris text). 
70 See id. at art. IVbis (authors' rights "include the basic rights ensuring the author's 
economic interests"). 
71 After setting forth specific economic rights that the Convention protects in article 
IV bis(l), article IV bis(2) states the following: 
2. However, any Contracting State may, by its domestic legislation, make ex-
ceptions that do not conflict with the spirit and provisions of this Convention, to 
the rights mentioned in paragraph I of this Article. Any State whose legislation 
so provides, shall nevertheless accord a reasonable degree of effective protection 
to each of the rights to which exception has been made. 
Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 69, at art. IVbis(2). By juxtaposing the ex-
ceptions that paragraph (2) authorizes with the term "[H]owever," the UCC impliedly 
sanctions moral right so long as it does not hinder exploitation of economic right. In 
theory, and sometimes in practice (as in Huston), this hindrance is inevitable. 
72 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 345. 
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States would not join the Berne Convention, in part, because its 
domestic law imposed significant formalities for copyright pro-
tection that contravened the Berne Convention's provisions.73 
The UCC incorporates the formalities the United States required 
prior to its joining the Berne Convention in 1989, which it still 
requires for causes of action arising prior to March 1, 1989.74 
Because the UCC's formalities create insurmountable barriers for 
unsophisticated authors, the Berne Convention provides the only 
assurance of international protection for many unwitting artists. 
2. Authorship Under the UCC 
Like the Berne Convention, the UCC does not define "author." 
Several passages in the Convention, however, demonstrate a less 
strict approach to the "creator as author" rule than appears in 
the Berne Convention. For example, article IV prescribes the 
minimum term of protection as the life of the author plus twenty-
five years after her death.75 Following this prescription, the Con-
vention addresses those Contracting States that compute duration 
"from the first publication of the work,"76 and authorizes those 
states that do not use such a durational method to adopt such a 
method. 77 This broad recognition of a "date of publication" 
measure78 diverges from the Berne Convention, which only ap-
plied such a measure to anonymous and pseudonymous works.79 
Because work-for-hire is the other primary class of works that 
uses a "date of publication" measure, and because employers and 
principals who acquire authorship status in such works are fre-
73Id. at 345 n.4. 
74 See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 69, at art. 111(2). "[A]ll ... copies of 
the work published with the authority of the author or other copyright proprietor [must] 
bear the symbol c accompanied by the name of the copyright proprietor and the year of 
first publication placed in such manner and location as to give reasonable notice of claim 
of copyright." 17 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West Supp. 1991) (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
75Id. at art. IV(2)(a). 
76Id. The Berne Convention, too, bases its duration scheme for anonymous and pseu-
donymous works on an "after publication" basis rather than on a "life of author" basis. 
Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 7(3). 
77 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 69, at art. IV(2)(b). 
78 The UCC's sweeping endorsement of the "date of publication" measure precludes 
application of the same assertion Ricketson advanced in relation to the Berne Convention 
that the UCC employs a general rule of author as natural person. See supra notes 46, 55-
56 and accompanying text. 
79 See Berne Convention, supra note 30, at art. 7(3) (fifty year term of protection for 
anonymous and pseudonymous works dates from time work is lawfully made available to 
the public). 
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quently corporate entities, the VCC could be read to approve of 
granting authors' rights to non-natural persons. The fact that the 
Vnited States was the motivating force for the VCC further sup-
ports this suggestion; V.S. copyright law does not distinguish 
between natural and non-natural persons for authorship 
purposesBO and uses the date of publication as the alternative 
measure for works-for-hire.B1 
3. Work-for-Hire Vnder the VCC 
The VCC does not address the work-for-hire doctrine. The 
policies it advances, however, are far less hostile to the work-for-
hire doctrine than the Berne Convention's policies.82 For exam-
ple, the VCC expressly indicates that it protects authors' economic 
rights83 and never mentions moral right. The VCC also provides 
that any exceptions a Contracting State may make to the VCC 
protective scheme must remain consistent with the "spirit and 
provisions of" the Convention.84 This latter provision, in con-
junction with the VCC's explicit support of economic rights, sug-
gests that the Convention greatly favors economic rights and is 
averse to any scheme that could jeopardize these rights. Further-
more, this reading implies that the holder of copyright economic 
rights may receive preferential treatment under the VCC over the 
holder of moral right in the same work. Therefore, a country 
that recognizes both work-for-hire and moral right, but that nei-
ther employs "deemed authorship" principles85 nor permits 
waiver or transfer of moral right, would theoretically contravene 
the VCC.86 
80 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1988) (author of work made for hire is employer or principal). 
81 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (for works made for hire created on or after January 1, 
1978, the term of protection lasts seventy-five years after publication, or one hundred 
years after creation, whichever is shorter); see also 17 U.S.C. § 303 (for works made for 
hire created before January 1, 1978, but not published or registered, the term of protec-
tion lasts seventy-five years after publication, or one hundred years after creation, which-
ever is shorter). 
82 See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
83 See Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 69, art. IVbis(l) (defining the rights 
that the Convention protects as "the basic rights ensuring the author's economic inter-
ests"). 
84Id. at art. IVbis(2). 
85 "Deemed authorship" is "the device of conferring the status of author on persons 
who are not the actual intellectual creator." RICKETSON, supra note 31, at 902. 
86 Virtually every EC Member State is a party to either the 1952 (Geneva) or 1971 
(Paris) text of the UCc. See Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright Law, in INTERNA-
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Nonetheless, two clauses within the UCC could prevent such a 
violation from occurring. The first of these is the "Berne Safe-
guard Clause."87 This clause "prohibits a Berne Convention coun-
try from denouncing Berne and relying on the UCC in its copy-
right relations with members of the Berne Convention."88 
Although this provision affects relations between Berne mem-
bers, it does not affect copyright within a Berne Convention 
country; therefore, the clause cannot influence domestic copy-
right policy. 
The second clause, article XVII, does impact domestic copy-
right policy: "This Convention shall not in any way affect the 
provisions of the Berne Convention ... or membership in the 
Union created by that Convention."89 Because this article man-
dates deference to the Berne Convention, it effectively safeguards 
moral right in Berne Convention countries even where it hinders 
exploitation of economic rights in contravention of the UCC. 
Because all EC Member States belong to the Berne Convention 
and the UCC, the Berne Convention's preeminence undercuts 
the protection that the UCC theoretically affords to work-for-
hire copyright holders. As a result, persons asserting rights as 
work-for-hire copyright holders in the EC must turn to either 
EC or national copyright law. 
II. EC POLICIES AND NATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. The Treaty of Rome 
1. An Overview 
The state of EC copyright law depends on the broad EC policy 
objectives set forth in the Treaty of Rome of 1988 (the Treaty). 
Although the Treaty itself does not explicitly apply to copyright 
law, the Court of Justice and the European Commission have 
interpreted the Treaty to have such an application.90 
TIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, § 6 app. (citing WIPO, supra note 
41). 
87 LEAFFER, supra note 1, at 346. 
88Id. at 347 n.18. 
89 Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 69, at art. XVU(l). 
90 See, e.g., Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte, 
1971 E.C.R. 487 (Article 36's exceptions for restrictions and prohibitions to protect 
commercial property apply to copyright)(cited in Herman C. Jehoram et aI., The Law of 
the E.E.C. and Copyright, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, 
at 7; see also Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology-Copyright 
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The Treaty, and the European Community it establishes, rep-
resent the culmination of efforts by several European countries 
to confront historical differences and modern economic reality. 
Article 2 describes the EC's intentions: 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a com-
mon market and progressively approximating the economic 
policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, 
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer 
relations between the States belonging to it.91 
Article 3 contains the EC's primary strategy for realizing its goals. 
This article provides, in part, for the following means: 
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs 
duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and 
export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent 
effect; 
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to 
the freedom of movement for persons, services and capital; 
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in 
the common market is not distorted; 
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the 
extent required for the proper functioning of the common 
market. ... 92 
These provisions indicate that the EC's underlying purpose is to 
create a single, unfettered market in which Member States and 
their citizens may reap the greatest economic benefit from their 
goods and services. 
2. The Copyright Challenge 
Copyright law poses a challenge to the EC's goals.93 The chal-
lenge is how to reconcile the infinite number of monopolies na-
Issues Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88) 172 final at 19 (Treaty provisions on free 
circulation of goods "apply broadly ... to goods subject to copyright")[hereinafter Green 
Paper]. 
9j TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 2 
(1988 text). 
92 !d. at art. 3. 
9' Patent law raises questions similar to copyright. Although this article recognizes such 
similarities, this article does not consider them. 
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tional copyright law grants with the EC's essential aim of estab-
lishing an unfettered common market. Copyright law potentially 
conflicts with the EC's notion of a barrier-free market because it 
permits copyright holders to decide who may use their intellectual 
property, where they may use it, and for how long. In the event 
an EC copyright owner attempts to partition markets, for exam-
ple by licensing a copyrighted work in several EC countries with-
out complying with each country's national copyright laws, the 
owner may violate article 3(a).94 
3. The Response 
The Treaty bestows privileges on intellectual property that 
diverge from the Treaty's general policy against quantitative re-
strictions.95 Quantitative restrictions may include quotas, tariffs, 
duties, or any other measures that impede the exchange of goods 
between EC Member States. Articles 30 to 34 forbid EC Member 
States from increasing preexisting96 or establishing new quanti-
tative restrictions among themselves,97 or on their national ex-
ports.98 Article 36, however, provides a special exemption for 
quantitative restrictions intended to protect intellectual prop-
erty:99 "The provisions of [a]rticles 30 to 34 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 
justified on grounds of . . . the protection of industrial and 
commercial property."IOO Article 36 only prohibits measures that 
act "as a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restric-
tion on trade between Member States."IOI In sum, the Treaty 
94 Copyrights and copyright licenses do not constitute per se quantitative restrictions, 
but rather "measure[s] having equivalent effect." EEC TREATY art. 3(a) (1988 text). 
"[R]ecourse to copyright law as a means of artificially partitioning the market is as 
effectively prohibited, being equivalent in effect to a quantitative restriction, as recourse 
to patent or trade mark law." Green Paper, supra note 90, at 19. Copyright may have an 
"equivalent effect" because it permits citizens of one country to bar citizens in a second 
country from freely using property that would otherwise be lawfully available. 
95 Article 30 establishes a general ban on quantitative restrictions within the EC: "Quan-
titative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall ... be 
prohibited between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 30 (1988 text). 
96 [d. at art. 32. 
97 [d. at art. 31 (1987 text). 
98 [d. at art. 34 (1988 text). 
99 Although Article 36 provides exemptions for "industrial and commercial property," 
copyright's economic components are comparable to industrial property rights and are, 
therefore, within Article 36's scope. Jehoram, supra note 90, at 8. 
100 EEC TREATY art. 36 (1988 text). 
101 [d. 
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defers to national law, provided the copyright schemes adopted 
do not create barriers between Member States. 
Article 222 also buttresses Member States' ability to develop 
their own copyright systems. This article states that "[t]his treaty 
shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing 
the system of property ownership." 102 The European Commission 
has interpreted this article to apply to questions of nationalizing 
or privatizing property ownership.lo3 Copyright economic and 
moral rights are thus property rights, which suggests that copy-
right law falls under article 222's grant of authority to Member 
States. Even assuming article 222 applies to copyright, however, 
the exemption limitation contained in article 36 will bar any 
national property law that restricts or discriminates against an-
other Member State. 104 Thus, article 222, like article 36, exem-
plifies the EC policy of deferring to national copyright law, but 
only to the extent the law does not inhibit the common market. 
4. Impact on Work-for-Hire 
The Treaty neither inhibits nor promotes the work-for-hire 
doctrine. In effect, it establishes guidelines by which each EC 
Member State may develop its own copyright laws. The only real 
limit arises when a particular copyright scheme constitutes "ar-
bitrary discrimination" or a "disguised trade restriction" in vio-
lation of article 36. Though these limitations apply broadly to 
copyright in general, they do not directly relate to work-for-hire 
rules. 
Nonetheless, the disparity in EC Member States' work-for-hire 
rules lO5 indirectly raises article 36 issues. As this article demon-
strates below, two mutually exclusive work-for-hire approaches 
prevail in the EC.106 An article 36 violation may exist because 
102Id. at art. 222. 
103 Green Paper, supra note 90, at 24. 
104 Cf. id. ("[T]he content of proprietary rights, the scope of protection afforded to 
them and the limits on their use may be regulated by the Community to the extent 
required by its objectives, and in particular, to the extent required for the proper func-
tioning of the common market."). 
105 See discussion infra part II.C. 
106 The division falls between the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands on 
the one hand; and Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
and Spain on the other. The former group either adopts the type of work-for-hire scheme 
used in the United States or recognizes contractual transfer or waiver of moral right that 
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these rules enable copyright holders of one Member State to 
exercise rights supra-nationally that can impair the rights con-
ferred by another Member State's copyright scheme. 107 A review 
of each Member State's work-for-hire rules is necessary to un-
derstand the scope of the article 36 issue in EC copyright law. 
B. National Treatment 
The territoriality principle governs the scope of copyright pro-
tection in the EC.I08 The principle provides that "intellectual 
property rights are only effective within each territorially isolated 
jurisdiction which grants the rights."109 As a result, each Member 
State determines the conditions and procedures under which it 
will grant copyright protection. llo 
National copyright protection is almost divided evenly between 
a strict author's rights approach and a common law-oriented, 
economic rights approach. Member States utilizing a strict au-
thor's rights approach protect creators through a rigid moral 
right regime that, by definition, also restricts ownership rights in 
works made for hire. Member States employing an economics 
rights approach allow contractual relations to control the extent 
to which moral right may apply and, consequently, support own-
ership rights in works-for-hire. The following discussion catego-
rizes each EC Member State and explores the rights and limits 
each State creates for works made for hire. III 
effectively yields a U.S. work-for-hire result. The latter group maintains a moral right 
regime that essentially precludes complete unconditional exploitation of a work made for 
hire. [d. 
107 Cf Jehoram, supra note 90, at 12 (distinguishing inviolable national "grants" of 
intellectual property rights from the "exercise" of such rights that could be limited to the 
extent necessary to effectuate EC objectives); see discussion infra part II.C. 
108 Jehoram, supra note 90, at 9. 
109 [d. 
110 See Case 144/81, Nancy Kean Gifts BV v. Keurkoop BV, 1982 E.C.R. 2853 (in the 
absence of EC standardization or harmonization, national rules determine the extent of 
design protection)(quoted in Jehoram, supra note 90, at 41-42). 
111 This article focuses on the statutory law of each EC Member State. This focus 
necessarily precludes serious discussion of the judicial interpretation offered by the Mem-
ber States' courts. However, where applicable, the following sections reference judicial 
construction that substantially differs from the plain meaning suggested by the statutes 
themselves. 
50 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI, No.1 
1. Author's Rights Approach 
a. Belgium 
The Belgian copyright statutes do not expressly address works 
made for hire. Belgian copyright ownership provisions nonethe-
less indicate what response Belgian law would have to work-for-
hire copyright holders. In contrast to employees in common law 
countries, Belgian employees who create works in the scope of 
their employment acquire the copyright in the work. 112 Belgian 
law regards employees as authors who may then transfer their 
copyright interest to their employers. 113 Conversely, common law 
countries' work-for-hire rules treat employers as authors and give 
them copyright ownership. 
Employee-employer transfers, however, do not give employers 
unfettered discretion in exploiting the work. "Moral right re-
mains vested in each author even after full conveyance of all 
copyright-based economic interests."114 To this end, article 8 of 
the Belgian Law on Copyright states: "The assignee of copyright 
or the acquirer of the tangible object incorporating a work of 
literature, music or art may not modify the work in order to sell 
or exploit it, nor publicly exhibit the modified work, without the 
consent of the author or his successors in title."115 Furthermore, 
the law does not permit authors to transfer or waive the moral 
right of integrity contained in article 8. 116 Such moral right pro-
tection underscores Belgium's adherence to the civil law tradition 
of vesting creators with an immutable moral right. 
b. Denmark 
Similarly, Denmark maintains a work-for-hire structure. A 
composite of two statutory provisions suggests that Denmark also 
adheres to the civil law custom of separating copyright economic 
and moral rights. First, section 1 employs a strict "creator as 
author" rule: "The person producing a literary or artistic work 
shall have copyright therein .... "117 Section 1 is the only attempt 
112 Corbet, supra note 14, at 18. 
113 Id. 
114Id. at 27. 
115 Belgium Law on Copyright, art. 8 (1958 text), reprinted in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND 
TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 14, at Belgium. 
116Id. 
117 Denmark Copyright Law, supra note 14, at ch. 1 § 1. 
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at defining "author" in the entire statute; the provision, therefore, 
imposes a burden on employers to contract separately for the 
copyright in their employees' works. Second, section 3 gives the 
author several moral right protections: 
Both in copies of the work and when it is made available 
to the public, the author is entitled to be mentioned by name 
in accordance with the requirements of proper usage. 
The work must not be altered nor made available to the 
public in a manner or in a context which is prejudicial to the 
author's literary or artistic reputation, or to his individuality. 
The right of the author under this section cannot be waived 
except in respect of a use of the work which is limited in 
nature and extent. I IS 
Because no EC Member State (except Germany) I 19 prevents copy-
right transfers, Danish law would presumably permit an author 
to transfer her copyright to an employer if she created the work 
in the scope of employment. 
Such a transfer would not, however, create any limit on the 
employee's moral right. Since section 3 prohibits an author from 
waiving her moral rights of attribution, paternity, and integrity 
in most circumstances, it is unlikely that a contractual effort to 
transfer these rights would succeed. Moral right transfer is pre-
cluded both by the absence of any transfer provision, and the 
fact that, by definition, moral right is personal to the author. 
Assuming the law prohibits transfers, the author will always retain 
moral right; the only wayan employer can avoid an employee's 
moral right assertion is by securing the employee's waiver of those 
rights. Section 3 forecloses on this possibility in almost all 
circumstances l20 and thereby limits an employer's ability to freely 
exploit a work-for-hire. 
c. France 
France's copyright law specifically addresses the work-for-hire 
doctrine. The first article of France's copyright statute establishes 
rules governing works-for-hire. The first paragraph provides: 
lIB [d. § 3 (emphasis added). 
119 See discussion infra part II.B.l.d. 
120 Because the section only permits waivers for uses "limited in nature and extent," an 
attempt to waive all moral rights or an attempt to waive those rights in perpetuity would 
necessarily fail. A complete waiver would be overly inclusive and thus would not be 
"limited in nature," and a permanent waiver would last for too long to be "limited in 
extent." Denmark Copyright Law, supra note 14, at ch.l § 3. 
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"The author of an intellectual work, shall, by the mere fact of its 
creation, enjoy an exclusive incorporeal property right in the 
work, effective against all persons."121 It also states in part: "The 
existence, or the conclusion by the author of an intellectual work, 
of a contract to make a work, or an employment contract, shall 
imply no exception to the enjoyment of the right recognized in 
the first paragraph." 122 In the employer-employee context, 
French courts have interpreted these provisions to give employers 
the economic component of copyright and employee-authors the 
moral right component. 123 The employer need not secure a sep-
arate transfer of copyright since she "acquires the economic com-
ponent of copyright upon execution of the employment contract 
.... "124 Because the economic component vests in the employer 
by virtue of the employment relationship, French law partially 
follows U.S. work-for-hire rules. 125 
French copyright law diverges from U.S. law in the principal-
independent contractor context. This· context usually involves 
commissioned works or works that will constitute part of a col-
lective whole. In France, authors of commissioned works retain 
both the economic and moral right components of copyright and 
transfer the economic rights to the principal.l26 The United 
States, in contrast, does not require any transfer between the 
creator and the principal, provided (1) the parties have an express 
writing describing the work as one for hire, and (2) the work falls 
into one of nine categories. 127 Once the principal satisfies both 
these requirements, she acquires the same rights that an employer 
has over works created in the scope of employment. 128 
121 French Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 1, para. 3. 
122 [d. at art. 1, para. 1. 
123 Plaisant, supra note 11, at 44. 
124 [d. 
125 In the United States, assuming a court makes a threshold determination that the 
creator is an employee, the employer will acquire the copyright in the work created. See 
17 U.S.C. § 20I(b) (1988) (establishing the presumption that the employer for whom an 
employee prepares a work is the author of the work and "owns all of the rights comprised 
in the copyright"). Of course, the question of what indicia establish an employer-employee 
relationship is a separate question. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence 
(CCNV) v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (relying on common law agency principles to decide 
whether an employment relationship exists); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
126 Plaisant, supra note 11, at 45. 
12717 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see supra note 5. 
128 17 U.S.c. § 20I(b) ("employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered author ... and owns all the rights comprised in the copyright") (emphasis 
added). 
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A significant exception to general French work-for-hire rules 
exists for computer software. For these works, French law is 
entirely consistent with U.S. work-for-hire in that employers ac-
quire both the economic and moral right component of the copy-
right. 129 By amendment in 1985, French copyright law now pro-
vides: "Unless otherwise stipulated, software created by one or 
more employees in the exercise of their duties shall belong to the 
employer together with all the rights afforded to other au-
thors."13o This provision represents a radical departure from 
France's strict moral right regime. 
France's generally uncompromising approach to moral right 
reflects the importance of moral right in the French conception 
of copyright law. France categorically prohibits transfer of moral 
right by providing that "[t]he author shall enjoy the right to 
respect for his name, his authorship, and his work. This right 
shall attach to his person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and 
imprescriptible." 131 In addition to nullifying transfers, this pro-
vision effectively proscribes moral right waivers as well. By mak-
ing moral right "imprescriptible," the law immunizes moral right 
against any limitation and thereby precludes waiver.132 These 
rules against waiver and transfer underscore the centrality of 
moral right in French law and indicate the structural hurdles 
owners of economic rights must overcome to successfully exploit 
works in France. 
d. Germany 
The concept of work-for-hire is entirely absent from German 
copyright law. 133 German law adheres to the basic principle that 
only the natural person who creates a work can be the work's 
author.134 In the employment context, "[t]he initial owner ... of 
129 Plaisant, supra note II, at 46 ("[A]II rights in specific software created on the job 
arise presumptively vested in the employer of its author, this without exclusion of moral 
right."). 
130 Law on Author's Rights and on the Rights of Performers, Producers of Phonograms 
and Videograms and Audiovisual Communication Enterprises, art. 45 (1985), reprinted in 
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 14, at France: Item lA, at 7. 
131 French Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
132 But see Plaisant, supra note II, at 85-86 (suggesting that an author might be able to 
legally renounce her right to disclose her work under her own name [the right to paternity] 
if the renunciation is "clear, precise, and express"). 
133 Dietz, supra note 14, at 46. 
134 [d. at 32.1. 
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a work made for hire or of a commissioned work is . . . always 
the author ... who actually created the work."135 By vesting 
ownership in the employee or the independent contractor, the 
law requires employers to acquire copyright interests by con-
tract. 136 
In addition, the idiosyncracies of German copyright law pre-
vent employers from ever acquiring unlimited copyright interests. 
For instance, an author can only convey a copyright by "testa-
mentary disposition, or to co-heirs pursuant to the settlement of 
an estate. Otherwise, it may not be conveyed."137 Instead, an 
author must license her work to realize the economic benefits her 
intellectual efforts have provided. 13s The existence of three moral 
right provisions-the right of dissemination, 139 the right to attri-
bution,140 and the right of integrityl41- also limit the extent to 
which an employer could ever freely exploit a work-for-hire. 
Nonetheless, the language the German Copyright Act uses to 
describe these rights suggests a more flexible moral right ap-
proach than that which French copyright law follows. 142 
German moral right provisions imply that an author may waive 
her moral right. 143 Article 39 of the German Copyright Act states 
that "[i]n the absence of any contrary agreement, a licensee may 
not alter the work, its title or the designation of the author .... "144 
These alterations concern the moral rights of integrity and attri-
bution. The fact that this article refers to a "contrary agreement" 
indicates the Copyright Act recognizes contractual waivers of 
moral right. As one commentator has suggested, however, even 
though an author can waive her moral right of integrity under 
article 39, the beneficiary of such a waiver does not have unlim-
ited freedom to alter the work. 145 Alterations are limited to those 
135 [d. at 46. 
136 See German Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 43 (employers and principals must 
resort to contract to acquire copyright interests in works created in employment context). 
137 [d. at art. 29. 
138 See id. at arts. 31-44 (detailing the licensing structure through which an author may 
exploit her work). 
139 [d. at art. 12. 
140 [d. at art. 13. 
141 [d. at art. 14. 
142 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
143 Dietz, supra note 14, at 91. 
144 German Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 39. 
145 Dietz, supra note 14, at 91. 
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which do not constitute a "gross distortion" of the work. 146 Ac-
cordingly, any alteration amounting to a "gross distortion" tran-
scends "the outer limits of the basic core of those moral rights 
which the author can always claim notwithstanding any agree-
ment to the contrary."147 While it is unclear what kind of altera-
tion would constitute a "gross distortion," the standard provides 
the beneficiary of an author's moral right waiver with some lati-
tude to adapt the work. In light of the more stringent moral right 
standards elsewhere in the EC, this latitude offers some conso-
lation to work-for-hire copyright holders. 
e. Greece 
Work-for-hire rules do not exist under Greek copyright law. 
Like most civil law countries, Greek law vests initial copyright 
ownership in the human being who actually created the work. 148 
Employers cannot alter this principle by contract. 149 Instead, em-
ployers must acquire copyright interests in works made in the 
scope of employment in the same manner as any person or entity 
would acquire a copyright interest-by transfer from the au-
thor. 150 
Employers must also contend with potential moral right claims. 
The Greek Copyright Act expressly provides for the right of 
attribution or paternity l51 and the right of integrity. 152 The right 
of attribution requires the copyright owner to identify the author 
146 [d. at 91-92 (reasoning that the "gross distortion" limit drawn by Article 39 in relation 
to cinematographic works is the limit of rights that an author can waive for any work). 
147 [d. at 92. 
148 Koumantos, supra note 14, at 18. 
149 [d. 
150 Unlike German law which forbids inter-vivos copyright transfers, Greek copyright 
law expressly permits transfer of copyright interests: 
Writers, composers, painters, authors of drawings, sculptors, turners and en-
gravers of original works, arrangements, copies or translations, shall have, for 
life, the exclusive right of publication, multiplication by reproduction, or copying 
by any means and in any manner . . . ; they shall also have the privilege to 
transfer these rights to others. 
Greek Copyright Law, supra note 14, art 1. 
151 See id. at art. 13 (republication of materials from periodicals or newspapers in other 
periodicals or newspapers must indicate the materials' source and author); see also id. at 
art. 14 (copies of photographic and "similar works," and motion pictures must bear names 
of photographer or publisher, the date of publication, and the names of the creators of 
their "component artistic parts"). 
152 !d. at art. 15 ("The assignee of the author's or artist's rights shall not be entitled to 
alter the work in any manner without the latter's consent."). 
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whenever the owner publishes the work. The latter right forbids 
the copyright owner from altering the work without the author's 
consent. Greek law also generally recognizes two other moral 
right provisions: the rights of divulgation and access to the au-
thor's work. 153 These two rights, respectively, enable the author 
to determine under what circumstances her work will appear and 
to gain access to her work, although she no longer owns it. The 
array of Greek moral rights clearly burdens any interest an em-
ployer may acquire in an employee's work. 
Furthermore, Greek law only offers limited room to escape 
moral right assertions. Greece, like Germany, France, Denmark, 
and Belgium, adheres to the civil law notion that moral right is 
personal to the author and therefore nontransferable. 154 Yet, 
despite the nontransferability of moral right, Greek law recog-
nizes a narrow moral right waiver. A waiver could arise in relation 
to the rights of divulgation and paternity where an author con-
tractually renounces her power to decide when to publish her 
work and agrees to publish without mentioning her name. 155 A 
waiver of the right of divulgation would provide some relief to 
publishing houses that hold copyrights in books and other media 
and wish to time publication themselves. Similarly, an employer 
who holds the copyright in a work an employee created and who 
seeks to label the work as her own may benefit from a right of 
attribution waiver. In sum, although Greece does not preclude 
employers from disarming their employees of their moral right, 
Greek copyright law places significant hurdles in the way of un-
limited economic exploitation of works-for-hire. 
f. Italy 
Italian copyright law recognizes the work-for-hire doctrine in 
limited circumstances. 156 In most employment relationships, 
work-for-hire does not apply and contract principles alone govern 
153 Although Greek statutory law only specifies two specific moral rights, Professor 
Koumantos identifies a total of four moral rights. Koumantos, supra note 14, at 28 (citing 
the rights of divulgation, paternity, integrity, access to material work). 
154Id. at 30. 
155Id. at 29. Professor Koumantos suggests that while such waivers could occur, the law 
theoretically prohibits them. !d. As to the right of paternity, the prohibition stems from 
the Copyright Act's explicit provisions in articles 13 and 14; see supra note 150. 
156 Mario Fabiani, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 
11, at 36. 
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copyright ownership.157 Work-for-hire rules apply with varying 
force to collective works,158 cinematographic works,159 and pho-
tographs. 160 Even in these contexts, however, general common 
law countries' work-for-hire regulations do not have full effect 
since Italy's moral right structure limits employers' discretion in 
exploiting works-for-hire. Italian copyright law sharply contrasts 
"rights of economic utilization" which accrue under work-for-
hire rules with "moral right of the author" which only vests in 
persons whom the law recognizes as author.161 This dichotomy 
demonstrates that the Italian structure adheres to the general 
civil law tradition separating copyright's economic interests from 
personal moral right interests which only authors hold. 
Several articles in the Italian Copyright Act vest "rights of 
economic utilization" in persons other than authors by using 
work-for-hire notions. First, article 38 grants publishers of col-
lective works economic rights "in the absence of agreement to 
the contrary."162 Because publishers are generally not the person 
or persons who actually select and coordinate collective works, 
publishers' rights devolve from work-for-hire principles. Article 
7 underscores this point since it explicitly recognizes the editor 
of a collective work, not the publisher, as the author. 163 
Second, article 45 gives economic rights to producers of cine-
matographic works: "[T]he exercise of the rights of economic 
utilization of a cinematographic work shall belong to the person 
who has organized the production of the said work."164 Like 
157 [d. at 38. 
158 See Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 7; see also Fabiani, supra note 156, 
at 36. 
159 Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 45; see also Fabiani, supra note 156, at 
36. 
160 Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 88; see also Fabiani, supra note 156, at 
36. 
161 Compare Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at arts. 12-19 (setting forth the 
exclusive economic rights granted by copyright) and arts. 25-32bis (establishing the du-
ration of economic rights) with arts. 20-24 (describing the author's moral right and its 
duration). 
162/d. at art. 38. Article 3 defines collective works as works "formed by the assembling 
of works, or of parts of works, and possessing the character of a self-contained creation 
resulting from selection and co-ordination for a specific literary, scientific, didactic, reli-
gious, political or artistic purpose, such as encyclopedias, dictionaries, anthologies, mag-
azines and newspapers." [d. at art. 3. 
16'[d. at art. 7. Article 7 states, in part: "In the case of a collective work, the person 
who organizes and directs its creation shall be deemed to be the author." [d. 
164 [d. at art. 45. Unlike the publisher's absolute economic rights, article 46 greatly limits 
a producer's ability to exploit a cinematographic work. Article 46 bars producers from 
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article 7, article 44 demonstrates that a producer's rights arise 
from work-for-hire rules since it omits producers from the group 
of persons who qualify as authors of cinematographic works. 165 
Third, under article 88, where an author creates a photographic 
work pursuant to an employment contract or a commission, the 
employer or person commissioning the work acquires "[t]he ex-
clusive right of reproduction, diffusion, and circulation."166 Al-
though no provision defines who the author of a photographic 
work is, the fact that a photographer provides the creative input 
into such a work suggests she is the author. Assuming the pho-
tographer is the author, the fact that article 88's exclusive rights 
vest in the person employing or commissioning the photographer 
indicates that these rights arise by virtue of work-for-hire rules. 
The presence of a strong moral right structure in Italian copy-
right law limits the rights created by work-for-hire principles. In 
addition, because Italy characterizes moral right as "inaliena-
ble,"167 an employer cannot secure an effective contractual trans-
fer of an employee's moral right. Moreover, "by their very nature 
as rights of personality, moral rights cannot be waived."168 The 
only moral right limitations exist in relation to modifying archi-
tectural works for construction purposes169 and cinematographic 
works for adaptation purposes. l7O In light of Italy's well-defined 
moral right structure, employers who hold copyrights in works 
made for hire must consider the potential limits that Italian law 
creates. 
g. Luxembourg 
Luxembourg copyright law does not recognize work-for-hire 
principles. Instead, the law concisely describes authors' economic 
rights accruing from copyright and authors' personal moral 
making or showing "elaborations, transformations or translations of the produced work 
without the consent of the authors indicated in Article 44." Id. at art. 46. 
165Id. at art. 44. Article 44 states: "The author of the subject, the author of the scenario, 
the composer of the music and the artistic director shall be considered as co-authors of a 
cinematographic work." Id. 
166Id. at art. 88. Where a commissioned photograph is at issue, the photographer is 
entitled to "equitable remuneration" for any economic use of the work. Id. 
167 !d. at art. 22. 
168 Fabiani, supra note 156, at 65. 
169 Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 20 ("author may not oppose modifica-
tions found necessary in the course of construction" or "completed works"). 
17°Id. at art. 47. 
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rights. Article 1 provides the basic rule for authors: "The author 
of literary or artistic works shall enjoy therein an incorporeal 
property right which shall be exclusive and exercisable against all 
persons."171 Although the copyright statute does not define the 
term "author," the fact that Luxembourg is a civil law country 
and civil law countries (except for the Netherlands) uniformly 
follow the "creator as author" rule172 would indicate that only 
creators can secure copyright interests under the statute. By im-
plication, this position precludes employers from acquiring copy-
right interest upon creation as work-for-hire rules generally dic-
tate. 173 
Employers and principals must acquire copyright interests by 
contractual transfers from employees or independent contrac-
tors. The interest that either may acquire is limited to the eco-
nomic right of exploitation. Article 3 defines this exploitation 
right and authorizes its assignment and transfer: "The right to 
reproduce the work or to disclose it in any way to the public, and 
to authorize the reproduction or disclosure thereof, shall consti-
tute the author's exclusive right of exploitation. The right of 
exploitation may be assigned or transferred, wholly or partially 
.... "174 Apart from the exploitation right an employer or prin-
cipal may secure, article 9 of the Luxembourg Act gives authors 
a personal moral right of integrity and attribution. 175 The fact 
that moral right "attaches to the author personally," indicates an 
author cannot alienate the right through an inter-vivos transfer. 
Moreover, in view of Luxembourg's overall scheme, the personal 
nature of moral right also precludes moral right waiver. These 
171 Luxembourg Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 1. 
172 Cf Paul Goldstein, Overview of Legal Considerations Affecting International Copyright 
Transactions, Address to the University of Southern California Entertainment Law Institute 
(Apr. 27, 1991), in CREATION, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 63, at 685-86 (dis-
cussing the civil law tradition which favors protecting author's creations). 
173 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). Under this provision, assuming the parties share the 
requisite employment or commissioning relationship, the employer or commissioning 
party stands in the shoes of the creator as author and acquires all copyright interests 
upon creation. Id. 
174 Luxembourg Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 3. 
175 Article 9 provides: 
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honor or reputation. The right referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be 
attached to the author personally. 
!d. at art. 9. 
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prohibitions are consistent with most civil law countries and em-
body the usual limitations on works-for-hire that can potentially 
impair the economic exploitation of these works. 176 
h. Portugal 
Portugal offers very limited work-for-hire rights. These rights 
can only arise by contract. Article 14( 1) of the Portugal Copyright 
Law provides the basis for an employer or independent contrac-
tor to acquire a copyright interest upon creation of a work. This 
article provides: "[O]wnership of copyright in a work carried out 
on commission or on behalf of another person, either in fulfill-
ment of official duties or under an employment contract, shall 
be determined in accordance with the relevant agreement."177 The 
"relevant agreement" clause indicates that the parties may deter-
mine copyright ownership by contract prior to creation. Thus, 
Portugal adopts an approach that is somewhat analogous to the 
commissioned works category in the U.S. work-for-hire statute. 178 
This provision, however, solely addresses copyright ownership 
and does not derogate from Portugal's strict "creator as author" 
rule. Because Portuguese copyright law does not change the cre-
ator's status even with works-for-hire, creators retain the ability 
to claim moral right protection. 179 
In Portugal, the economic and moral right dichotomy severely 
limits exploitation of works-for-hire. Even assuming an employer 
or independent contractor acquires the economic component of 
an author's interest, Portuguese copyright law prohibits them 
176 See discussion supra parts II.B.I.a-f and discussion infra parts n.B.I.h-i. 
I77 Portugal Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 14(1) (emphasis added). 
178 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (noting that commissioned works are works-for-hire if 
the work falls into one of nine categories and the parties have agreed in a signed writing that 
the work is one for hire). 
179 See Portugal Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 9. Portuguese copyright law 
expressly addresses the difference between copyright ownership and authorship rights in 
article 9: 
Id. 
(1) Copyright shall include economic rights and personal rights, termed moral 
rights. 
(2) In the exercise of economic rights, the author shall have the exclusive right 
to dispose of his work, to exploit it and to use it, or to authorize its total or 
partial exploitation or use by a third party. 
(3) Independently of economic rights, and even after their transfer or lapse, 
the author shall enjoy moral rights in his work, in particular the right to claim 
authorship and to ensure its authenticity and integrality. 
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from securing a transfer or waiver of the author's moral right. 180 
This prohibition stems from article 56(2)'s description of moral 
right as "perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible_"181 This char-
acterization aligns Portugal with most civil law countries that use 
moral right to compensate authors for their unfair bargaining 
position vis-a-vis employers. To the extent economic exploitation 
of works-for-hire will impair their creators' moral rights of integ-
rity and paternity, copyright holders in such works must consider 
the limitations they may encounter. 
1. Spain 
Spanish copyright law recognizes the work-for-hire doctrine in 
two limited contexts. 182 The first is in relation to collective works 
as described in article 8: 
[A] collective work shall be considered a work which is created 
on the initiative and under the direction of a person, whether 
a natural person or legal entity, who edits and publishes it 
under his name, and which consists of the combination of 
contributions by various authors whose personal contribu-
tions are so integrated in the single, autonomous creation for 
which they have been made that it is not possible to ascribe 
to anyone of them a separate right in the whole work so 
made. In the absence of agreement to the contrary, the rights 
in the collective work shall vest in the person who publishes 
and discloses it under his name. IS3 
This provision creates a rule of "deemed authorship" in favor of 
publishers of collective works. This means that a publisher ac-
quires authorship status and both the economic and moral right 
copyright interest that such status provides. 184 With both of these 
rights, the collective work publisher faces no potential limitations 
on economic exploitation and therefore holds a work-for-hire 
interest akin to the interest created under U.S. law. 
180 Portuguese moral right consists of the rights of paternity and integrity. See id. at 
arts. 9(3), 56(1) (referring to the moral rights of paternity and integrity). 
181 [d. at art. 56(2). This language is identical to the language found in France's copyright 
statute. See French Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 6. 
182 Milagros del Corral refers to four areas in which work-for-hire rules apply: collective 
works, works made in employment relationships, works made for the press, and works 
made on commission. Milagros del Corral, Spain, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 26-28. This article only considers the first two because they 
subsume the principles governing the latter two. 
183 Spanish Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 8. 
184 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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In contrast to collective works, the second context does not 
confer authorship status and therefore does not permit unlimited 
exploitation. The second context consists of works created III 
employment relationships as set forth in article 51: 
(1) [The transfer to an employer of rights I85] to exploit a 
work created by virtue of employment relations shall be gov-
erned by the terms agreed upon in the contract, which shall 
be made in writing. 
(2) In the absence of an agreement in writing, it shall be 
presumed that the exploitation rights have been assigned 
exclusively and with the scope necessary for the exercise of 
the customary activity of the [employer] at the time of the 
delivery of the work by virtue of the said employment rela-
tions. 
(4) The remaining provisions of this Law shall apply to the 
aforesaid assignments as appropriate, insofar as the purpose 
and subject matter of the contract so determine. I86 
Article 51 does not clearly describe the scope of its application. 187 
It appears to distinguish employment relationships on the basis 
of whether an employer has contracted with his or her employees 
for copyright interests in works they create. On the one hand, 
article 51 (1) implies that employers' copyright interests in their 
employees' work only exist to the extent determined by contract. 
This reading assumes that a contract does in fact exist, but does 
not say whether an employer must contract for a copyright in-
terest. On the other hand, article 51 (2) seems to apply where no 
copyright contract exists, and purports to limit an employer's 
copyright exploitation to purposes ordinarily related to the em-
ployer's business. In sum, under 51(2), an employer can acquire 
some minimum exploitation right, but only in relation to work-
related enterprises. Because 51 (2) limits employers so extensively, 
51(1) supports a general rule imposing a contractual requirement 
on employers as a condition to acquiring copyright interests. Such 
a reading would align Spain with most other civil law countries 
that require employers to contract for copyright interests in their 
employees' works. I88 
185 del Corral, supra note 182, at 26 (translation of article 51). 
186 Spanish Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. 51. 
187 del Corral, supra note 182, at 27. Article 51(4) "seems to presuppose the written 
'contract' mentioned in [51(1)] but does not make clear how it applies in the event, 
anticipated in [51(2)], no such 'contract' has been made." [d. (footnote omitted). 
188 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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Assuming an employer secures a copyright in work made for 
hire, Spain's formidable moral right regime raises barriers to 
unlimited economic exploitation. 189 Most significantly, Spanish 
copyright law prohibits the transfer and waiver of moral right. 
Article 14 describes an author's moral right as "unrenounceable 
and inalienable."190 This characterization demonstrates fidelity to 
the civil law tradition that safeguards authors' interests against 
encroachment by employers and similar persons. Spanish copy-
right law, as a result, hinders employers' work-for-hire interests 
to the extent that they do not arise from a written contract and 
their exploitation violates an author's moral right in the subject 
work. 
2. Economic Rights Approach 
a. Ireland 
Ireland has adopted several work-for-hire provlSlons in its 
copyright law. The Irish approach significantly parallels the 
United States and typifies the approach of common law countries. 
For example, Ireland follows the basic work-for-hire notion that 
an employer or principal acquires copyright ownership upon 
creation by an employee or independent contractor. 19l In addi-
tion, Ireland distinguishes between works created within an em-
ployer-employee relationship and commissioned works. 192 The 
commissioned works group is smaller than that found in the 
189 Spain recognizes seven different moral right interests. See Spanish Copyright Law, 
supra note 14, at art. 14 (elaborating the following rights: the right of divulgation; two 
separate rights of attribution; the right of integrity; the limited right to alter a work after 
a third party owns the work; the right of withdrawal; and the right of access to a rare 
copy of the work). 
190 [d. 
191 See Ireland Copyright Act, supra note 15, §§ 10(2)-10(4) (proprietors of newspapers 
and the like acquire limited copyright in employees' and apprentices' works published; 
persons commissioning certain works acquire copyright in works; in all other employment 
contexts, employers acquire copyright in works made by their employees or apprentices). 
192 Compare id. § 10(2) (proprietor of newspaper, magazine, or periodical holds copyright 
in works made by employees for publication under employment or apprenticeship con-
tracts) and id. § 10(3) (person who commissions photograph, portrait, or engraving, pays 
for the work, and the work is made pursuant to commission is entitled to copyright in 
the work) and id. § 10(4) (in cases other than works created for newspapers, periodicals, 
and commissions, employer acquires copyright interest in works made pursuant to service 
or apprenticeship contract) with 17 U .S.C. § 101 (1988) (identifying two types of works-
for-hire: the first arises when an employee creates a work in the scope of her employment; 
the second arises when a principal commissions a work falling into one of nine categories 
and the parties have a written agreement denoting the work as a work made for hire). 
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United States. Unlike the United States, which has nine types of 
commissioned works subject to work-for-hire rules,193 Ireland 
recognizes five: cinematographic films,194 photographs, portrait 
drawings, paintings, and engravings. 195 
Under Irish law, once an artist creates one of these works 
pursuant to a commission and receives consideration therefor, 
"the person who commissioned the work shall be entitled to any 
copyright subsisting therein .... "196 In contrast to U.S. law, Irish 
copyright law does not require the parties to specially designate 
the commissioned work as one made for hire in order for work-
for-hire rules to apply.197 Ireland's treatment of employer-em-
ployee works also differs from the United States. Irish copyright 
subdivides employer-employee works into two different cate-
gories. The first consists of works created by an author "in the 
course of his employment by the proprietor of a newspaper, 
magazine, or similar periodical under a contract of service or 
apprenticeship, and . . . for the purpose of publication in a 
newspaper, magazine, or similar periodical."198 In this context, 
the proprietor acquires the copyright interest in the work, but 
only "as it relates to publication of the work in a newspaper, 
magazine, or similar periodical."199 Thus, for example, if a news-
paper proprietor received an offer to adapt a story for a movie 
screenplay, the proprietor would not own the copyright in the 
story for screenplay purposes. Only the story's author could au-
thorize the screenplay since the screenplay does not relate to the 
"publication of the work in a newspaper, magazine, or similar 
periodical. " 
The second employer-employee category is a catch-all work-
for-hire provision that closely approximates U.S. law. In this sub-
division, the copyright in all works created in the course of an 
author's employment, except those created pursuant to a com-
mission or within the first employer-employee group, vests in the 
193 See supra note 5. 
194 Ireland Copyright Act, supra note 15, § 18(b)(3). 
195Id. § 10(3). 
196 [d. Substantially similar language applies to cinematographic works as well. See id. 
§ 18(b)(3) (person commissioning film who gives consideration therefor is entitled to 
copyright interest if film made in "pursuance of that commission"). 
197 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (requiring a writing signed by both creator and person 
commissioning work indicating work is "for hire"). 
198 Ireland Copyright Act, supra note 15, § 10(2). 
199Id. 
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employer if the author is working pursuant to a service or ap-
prenticeship contract. 200 Irish law does not define "the course of 
the author's employment," and therefore, a question could arise 
as to how to define the extent of an employer-employee relation-
ship. The U.S. Supreme Court squarely addressed this issue in 
Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) v. Reid. 201 The CCNV 
Court resolved the question by using traditional agency principles 
to determine whether an employer-employee relationship ex-
ists.202 It is uncertain how Ireland would resolve the question. 
One commentator has suggested, however, that under the former 
United Kingdom Copyright Act,203 the service or apprenticeship 
contract requirement obviates the need to inquire into "the scope 
of employment" question that CCNV addresses.204 Assuming this 
rationale would apply in Ireland, employers who have contracts 
with employees and apprentices will almost always acquire the 
rights in the copyrightable works they create in their employment 
capacities. 
Despite the strong copyright interest Irish law gives employers, 
employees retain some authority over the works they produce. 
This authority resides in section 54 of the 1963 Act, which effec-
tively establishes a limited moral right of attribution.205 Although 
this section does not explicitly identify its prohibition against 
"false attribution" as a moral right, its impact demonstrates such 
a right. First, the section refers only to "authors" and not to 
copyright holders or owners. 206 Second, the Irish work-for-hire 
200 !d. § 10(4). 
201 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
202 [d. at 751; see supra note 25 for CCNV's determining factors. 
203 The work-far-hire provisions contained in the former United Kingdom Copyright 
Act mirror Ireland's current scheme. See John Richards, Ownership of copyright: some 
international thoughts, 133 SOLIe. J. 1247, 1248 (1989). 
204 [d. at 1248-49 (comparing the new 1988 Copyright Act to the British Patents Act 
of 1977 to show that the language "course of employment" will almost give employers 
copyright interests in their employees' work). Because the 1988 Act eliminates the contract 
requirement, Richards' conclusion favoring employers implies that the added presence 
of an employment contract will conclusively establish an agency relationship by which an 
employer will gain the copyright interest in her employees' works. 
205 See Ireland Copyright Act, supra note 15, § 54 (setting forth several actions which 
constitute "false attribution of authorship"). 
206 See, e.g., id. §§ 54(2)-54(2)(d), 54(4)-54(4)(b), 54(6)-54(6)(b) (prohibiting the use, 
trade, sale, distribution, publication, reproduction, or performance of a work that bears 
the name of an author who has not created the work, and all of the above acts in relation 
to works bearing the author's name that someone other than the author has modified or 
altered). 
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provisions themselves distinguish employees from employers by 
identifying the former as "authors" and describing the latter as 
"entitled to the copyright."207 The failure to treat employers as 
authors suggests an intention to give employees, rather than em-
ployers, the right to object to false attributions under section 54. 
In sum, by characterizing the employees as authors, the Act gives 
employees a right independent of copyright to protest an em-
ployer's mislabelling of works created by employees. 
The ability to contract as a means of avoiding the attribution 
provision undermines any threat the provision may create. Sec-
tion 54 conditions false attribution violations on the failure to 
obtain a license to undertake any of the acts the section prohib-
its.208 Because a license to undertake such acts would preclude 
operation of section 54 prohibitions, an employer could avoid 
section 54 by obtaining a license from his or her employees as a 
condition of employment. Toward this end, employers could in-
corporate such licenses into the actual service or apprenticeship 
contract and secure themselves complete control over works-for-
hire. 
b. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is the only civil law country that has incor-
porated the work-for-hire doctrine into its copyright law. Three 
separate provisions form the basis of the Dutch work-for-hire 
scheme. First, article 6 provides: "If a work has been produced 
according to the plan and under the guidance and supervision 
of another person, that person shall be deemed to be the author 
of the work."209 This article would apply if, for example, an artist 
employs several artists at his or her studio to execute works.210 
Article 7 is the second Dutch work-for-hire provision. In the event 
another person employs the supervisor and the latter oversees 
the creation of a work in the course of his or her employment, 
207 [d. §§ 10(2)-10(4) (employer entitled to copyright when an author creates a work 
"in the course of his employment"). 
208 [d. § 54(2). Section 54(2) reads as follows: "A person ... contravenes those restrictions 
as respects another person if, without the license of that other person, he does any of the 
following acts in the State .... " [d. (emphasis added). 
209 Netherlands Copyright Law, supra note 15, at art. 6. 
210 See Herman C. Jehoram, Netherlands, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAC' 
TICE, supra note 11, at 30 (noting the examples of "auxiliary studio work done for a comic 
strip artist" and of Peter Paul Reubens overseeing his pupils execute his sketches). 
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article 7 indicates that the supervisor's employer IS the work's 
author.211 
Article 7 states: "Where work performed in the service of an-
other consists in the production of certain literary, scientific or 
artistic works, the person in whose service they were produced 
shall be deemed to be the author thereof, unless otherwise agreed 
between the parties."212 The article applies to employer-employee 
relationships "characterized by authority and salary," but not to 
principal-independent contractor relationships.213 The level of 
authority sufficient to create an employer-employee relationship 
raises the issue discussed earlier in relation to deciding the 
"course of employment" under Irish copyright law.214 Presum-
ably, the agency guidelines, relied on by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in CCNV,215 offer a standard by which Americans can judge 
whether their works-for-hire satisfy the Dutch rule in article 7. 
The CCNY factors require some qualification under Dutch law. 
In the Netherlands, employers' work-for-hire rights only arise in 
instances in which an employer "factually" addresses an employee 
to produce certain works.216 Article 7 will "not apply where the 
employee produces (other) works on his own initiative, whether 
in the time of his employer or even with the mere consent of his 
employer."217 This condition modifies the CCNY factor that looks 
at "whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring 
party"218 to also consider whether the employer actually 
prompted the work's creation. Therefore, if an employee creates 
a work on her own initiative, even while using her employer's 
facilities, receiving payment from her employer, following her 
employer's instructions, and even if the work is the type of work 
that the employer generally produces, the employee will be the 
work's author and will acquire all copyright interest in the work. 
In the context of universities and professors, the additional "ini-
211 [d. at 32. 
212 Netherlands Copyright Law, supra note 15, at art. 7. 
213 Jehoram, supra note 210, at 30. Article 8 of the Netherlands Copyright Law and 
article 6 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law govern, respectively, copyright ownership 
in commissioned works that arise from principal-independent contractor relationships 
and works of industrial design. [d. at 30, 32; see infra notes 220-23 and accompanying 
text. 
214 See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
215 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989); see supra note 25 for the CCNV agency factors. 
216 Jehoram, supra note 210, at 31. 
217 [d. 
218 490 U.S. at 752. 
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tiative factor" underlies the Dutch consensus that article 7 does 
not apply to works by professors and researchers.219 
Article 8 is the third provision addressing the work-for-hire 
doctrine. It states: "Any public institution, association, foundation 
or partnership which makes a work public as its own, without 
naming any natural person as the author thereof, shall be re-
garded as the author of the work, unless it is shown that making 
the work public in such manner was unlawful."220 This article 
covers works created in the course of a principal-independent 
contractor relationship. It also applies to all other works not 
covered by articles 6 and 7 where an entity has contracted for 
the right to publish the work as its own.221 In theory, this provision 
greatly exceeds the scope of U.S. work-for-hire rules since it 
permits an entity to acquire authorship status and all appurtenant 
copyright interests by publishing a work in its own name pursuant 
to contract. Article 8, unlike U.S. law, does not require an agency 
relationship222 nor limits itself to particular categories of works. 223 
Article 8's broad application significantly impacts moral right 
assertions a creator could otherwise make under Dutch copyright 
law.224 For example, under U.S. law, a writer who creates a novel 
would generally transfer her copyright interest to the publishing 
house that agreed to publish the novel. The publishing house 
would control publication, editing, and reprint decisions because 
a complete copyright transfer would divest an author of his or 
her copyright authority over such decisions. If a Dutch writer 
undertook the same transfer and did not agree to allow the pub-
lisher to publish the work in its name, he or she would retain 
authorship status and the attendant moral right authority to limit 
219 Jehoram, supra note 210, at 31. "Only where the university indeed has hired per-
sonnel with the specific task of writing a certain work can it rely on Article 7." [d. 
220 Netherlands Copyright Law, supra note 15, at art. 8. 
221 Jehoram, supra note 210, at 32. 
222 After CCNY, the first work-for-hire category contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) 
only applies to works arising out of an agency relationship. CCNY, 490 U.S. at 750-51. 
223 The second work-for-hire category contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101 applies only to 
commissioned works falling into one of nine categories. See supra note 5 and accompanying 
text (describing these categories). These provisions are somewhat analogous since both 
require independent contractors to contract for authorship interests. Article 7 requires a 
contractual agreement allowing an entity to publish the work under its name in order for 
the entity to acquire authorship status. Similarly, section 101's second category requires 
that a signed writing identify the work as one for hire in order for independent contractors 
to acquire authorship status. See Netherlands Copyright Law, supra note 15, at art. 7. 
224 See Netherlands Copyright Law, supra note 15, at art. 25. In general, the Netherlands' 
moral right provisions include paternity, integrity, and honor. [d. 
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the publisher's publication,225 editing,226 and reprint decisions. In 
the rare circumstances a Dutch writer agreed to allow the pub-
lisher to publish the book in its name,227 the publisher would 
acquire authorship status and both the economic and moral right 
copyright interest in the work. The writer would no longer have 
any copyright interest. Notwithstanding two exceptions,228 U.S. 
copyright holders in works made for hire can expect the same 
treatment in the Netherlands as they receive in the United States. 
c. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom fully recognizes work-for-hire principles. 
Section 11 sets forth the work-for-hire rules that apply to works 
created on or after August 1, 1989:229 
(1) The author of work is the first owner of any copyright 
in it, subject to the following provisions. 
(2) Where a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is 
made by an employee in the course of his employment, his 
employer is the first owner of any copyright in the work 
subject to any agreement to the contrary .... 230 
This section gives employers the status of authors and vests initial 
copyright interests in them absent any contrary agreement. Be-
cause employers acquire their interests upon creation and the 
employment relationship alone determines this interest, the Brit-
ish rule closely resembles the U.S. approach.23 ! Similar to the 
CCNV "scope of employment" analysis, British work-for-hire in-
terests depend on whether an employment relationship exists. 
225 Although Dutch law does not formally recognize the moral right of divulgation, the 
right of paternity could encompass the right to decide under what conditions a work with 
an author's name can appear. See id. at art. 25(a) (describing the moral right of paternity). 
226 Assuming an author makes a reasonable objection to editing changes, the moral 
right of integrity gives an author the editing authority. Id. at art. 25(b)-(c). 
227 Such a transfer is unlikely because an independent author would probably want the 
benefit of being acknowleged as the author. 
228 See supra notes 216-18, 222-23 and accompanying text. 
229 The 1956 version of the United Kingdom's Copyright Act applies to works created 
before August I, 1989. The work-for-hire rules under this earlier act are identical to 
Ireland's current rules. See discussion supra part II.B.2.a. 
230 United Kingdom CDPA, supra note 15, § II. 
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer 
... for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, 
and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by 
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." Id. 
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To determine whether such a relationship exits, the British 
offer their own version of CCNV. They focus on "whether the 
work forms an integral part of the business."232 This analysis 
depends on: 
whether the typical attributes of employment are present: 
whether regular sums are paid as wage or salary; whether 
income tax deductions are made on the "pay-as-you-earn" 
basis used for employees; whether there is a joint contribu-
tion to a pension scheme; whether national insurance contri-
butions are paid by both parties as for an employee. 233 
Assuming some or all of these attributes are present, an employer 
will acquire the copyright interest in the work. Even if the em-
ployment relationship does not satisfy this test, an employer could 
nonetheless acquire a copyright interest unimpaired by moral 
right. 
Unlike most EC countries, the United Kingdom permits moral 
right waivers. Section 87(1) provides that "[i]t is not an infringe-
ment of any of the [moral] rights conferred by this Chapter to 
do any act to which the person entitled has consented."234 Waivers 
remove doubts that can taint exploitation of works that otherwise 
qualify as works-for-hire, such as commissioned works and works 
created within an ongoing non-employment relationship. 
Waivers are especially useful in relation to commissioned works 
since such works are not generally within the British concept of 
an employment relationship. By securing both a copyright trans-
fer and a moral right waiver, a principal could exploit the work 
without concerns that an independent contractor would assert 
her moral right in protest. Likewise, because waivers "may relate 
to existing or future works,"235 persons in ongoing relationships 
can negotiate for waivers at the outset. This kind of option pro-
duces simplicity in contracting and certainty over the long-run 
since both the payor and the creator know the limits of their 
rights from the beginning. In the final analysis, the British moral 
right waiver is the only way to accomodate the moral right interest 
the Berne Union compels and the common law tradition of al-
lowing unfettered copyright exploitation. This system also pla-
232 William R. Cornish, United Kingdom, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 11, at 31. 
233Id. 
234 United Kingdom CDPA, supra note 15, § 87(1). 
235Id. § 87(2). 
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cates U.S. work-for-hire holders as it allows them to market their 
works without fear of limitation. 
C. Analysis 
The above overview of EC Member States' national work-for-
hire rules reveals three interrelated problems. The first problem 
is that the Member States differ over how copyright ownership 
in works-for-hire may arise. At one extreme, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg only allow creators to have 
the initial ownership interest and require employers to contract 
for copyright licenses or transfers. 236 Somewhere towards the 
center, France requires principals to contract with independent 
contractors, but employers need not contract with employees.237 
Similarly, Italy and Spain permit copyright ownership to flow 
directly to the employer in some circumstances,238 but not in 
others.239 At the other extreme, Ireland, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom nearly always vest copyright ownership in 
employers and principals upon creation.240 In essence, no single 
copyright ownership rule prevails in the EC for works-for-hire. 
236 See, e.g., Corbet, supra note 14, at 18 (Belgian law regards employees as authors from 
whom employers must acquire their copyright interest); Denmark Copyright Law, supra 
note 14, at ch. I § I (establishing a strict "creator as author" rule and implicitly requiring 
employers to contract for copyright interest); German Copyright Law, supra note 14, at 
art. 43 (employers and principals must contract to acquire copyright interests); Greek 
Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. I (transfer necessary to obtain copyright interests); 
Luxembourg Copyright Law, supra note 14, at art. I (use of "creator as author" rule 
implicitly requires employers to contract for copyright interest). 
237 Plaisant, supra note II, at 44 (French law gives employers copyright interests in 
employees' works by virtue of their employment relationship, but principals do not obtain 
such interests in independent contractors' work; the latter must contract for their own 
copyright interests). 
238 See, e.g., Italian Copyright Law, supra note 14, at arts. 38, 45, 88 (publishers of 
collective works, producers of cinematographic works, and persons commissioning pho-
tographic works all obtain economic copyright interest); Spanish Copyright Law, supra 
note 14, at arts. 8, 51 (publishers of collective works acquire both economic and moral 
right copyright interest, and employers acquire limited economic interest without con-
tract). 
239 See Fabiani, supra note 156, at 38 (in most contexts employers and principals must 
contract for copyright interests); del Corral, supra note 182, at 25 ("[s]ince ... only natural 
persons can be authors ... legal entities normally acquire copyright from such persons 
by contract."). 
240 See Ireland Copyright Act, supra note IS, §§ 10(2)-10(4) (proprietors of newspapers 
and the like acquire limited copyright in employees' and apprentices' works published; 
persons commissioning certain works acquire copyright in works; in all other employment 
contexts, employers acquire copyright in employees' or apprentices' works); Netherlands 
Copyright Law, supra note IS, at arts. 6-8 (giving authorship status and therefore com-
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The second problem is that the Member States disagree over 
who may be the author of a work-for-hire. This issue is significant 
since only an author can claim moral right. As a general rule, all 
EC Member States consider the natural person who created a 
work as the work's author. 241 In relation to authors of works made 
for hire, however, two distinct approaches emerge. These ap-
proaches break down according to the civil and common law 
traditions. On the one hand, the civil law countries, except for 
the Netherlands, adhere to the general rule almost without ex-
ception.242 On the other hand, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom deviate from the general rule and recognize 
employers and principals as authors of works made for hire.243 
The third problem arises from the divergent moral right treat-
ments existing within the EC. The discrepancies characterizing 
moral right proceed directly from the problem of determining 
authorship in works made for hire. That is, the same civil law 
countries that strictly follow the "creator as author" rule also 
forbid moral right transfer and waiver.244 The identical common 
law countries (and the Netherlands) that part from the "creator 
as author" rule also permit moral right transfer or waiver. 245 
Because these latter countries' work-for-hire and moral right re-
gimes most closely resemble the U.S. system, U.S. work-for-hire 
copyright holders can expect the same treatment under these 
countries' laws as they would receive in the United States.246 
plete copyright ownership to persons supervising work, to persons in whose service other 
persons have created works, and to legal entities publishing works in their own name); 
United Kingdom CDPA, supra note 15, § II (employers are authors of works created by 
employees in the "course of" their employment and employers thereby acquire all copy-
right interest in such works). 
241 DIETZ, supra note 6, at 41-42. 
242 The limited exception in civil law countries gives producers of cinematographic 
works limited authorship status. In addition, France recently diverged from the general 
rule to give computer software employers rights of authorship with respect to their 
employees. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 191-204,209-12,229-30 and accompanying text. 
244 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
245 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
246 Of course this parallel reverberates in contexts other than work-for-hire. Copyright 
holders in any kind of work would do well to secure a moral right waiver or transfer in 
a copyright assignment. Insofar as the EC common law countries and the Netherlands 
are concerned, contracting for a transfer or waiver would relieve doubts as to whether 
authors could legally object to the contemplated exploitation of their work. Because this 
article solely addresses works-for-hire, it does not fully explore all of the broader questions 
raised by moral right transfer and waiver in other kinds of works. See supra notes 243-
44 and accompanying text. 
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Similarly, British, Irish, and Dutch copyright holders in works-
for-hire can anticipate the same treatment in each other's country. 
In theory, British, Irish, and Dutch work-for-hire copyright 
holders cannot escape the moral right morass in the other EC 
Member States. 247 These holders face the two-fold problem of 
overcoming the other Member States' strict "creator as author" 
rule and the moral right transfer and waiver prohibition. To avoid 
these hurdles, work-for-hire copyright holders must turn to ei-
ther EC law or the Berne Convention.248 
The Berne Convention does not offer any authority for setting 
aside another Member State's "creator as author" or moral right 
rules. Although the Berne Convention may lean towards a strict 
"creator as author" rule,249 it offers no conclusive answer as to 
how to decide who may claim authorship in a work.250 As to 
moral right, the Berne Convention leaves resolution of the ques-
tion to nationallegislatures.251 When a party asserts a moral right 
claim or, in the alternative, seeks to deny another's moral right 
claim, the Berne Convention provides that the national law of 
the country in which the question arises governs the outcome.252 
While the Berne Convention treats the problem as national in 
scope, broader EC notions militate against such a position because 
they consider the law of the work's country of origin and of the 
country in which the issue arises. 
Nonetheless, current EC law offers work-far-hire copyright 
holders little guidance. The law does not offer direction due to 
a conflict between the Treaty's article 36 and the territoriality 
principle. Article 36 permits Member States to develop whatever 
copyright scheme they desire so long as it does not create barriers 
between the Member States.253 The territoriality principle limits 
247 The effect of a choice of law clause in other Member States is doubtful. See discussion 
infra part III.B. Assuming a choice of law contract provision fails, British, Irish, and 
Dutch work-for-hire copyright holders have no recourse under current EC law. 
248 The VCC does not provide any solution because its article XVII requires all EC 
Member States to follow the Berne Convention. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying 
text. 
249 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
250 See discussion supra part I.A.2. 
251 "The means of redress for safeguarding the [moral] rights granted by this Article 
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed." Berne 
Convention, supra note 30, at art. 6bis(3). 
252 [d. 
253 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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copyright protection to a particular Member State.254 Whereas 
the latter notion places a significant check on the kind of scheme 
a Member State may create, article 36 grants broad latitude. A 
Member State's choice to use a strict "creator as author" rule, a 
work-for-hire rule, or an "imprescriptible" moral right regime, 
complies with the territoriality principle because it does not ex-
tend beyond national boundaries. Such choices, however, could 
be read to violate article 36 because they limit other Member 
States' copyright grants. 
Problems under current national laws defy simple resolution. 
British, Irish, and Dutch law divest authors in the other nine 
Member States of their moral right if their work qualifies as a 
work-for-hire. Conversely, the other nine Member States divest 
work-for-hire copyright holders of their authorship status and 
thereby limit their ability to exploit the subject work because of 
the creator's moral right. In essence, the dilemma is how to 
determine whether a Member State's scheme violates article 36. 
Assuming, for example, an Irish copyright holder sought to mar-
ket an altered work-for-hire in Italy, the Irish creator of the work 
could protest under Italy's moral right of integrity.255 The copy-
right holder's reliance on Irish law may constitute an "exercise" 
of Irish national rights that discriminates against Italian national 
rights in violation of article 36. Alternatively, the creator's reliance 
on Italian law may constitute an "exercise" of Italian national 
rights that discriminates against Irish national rights in violation 
of article 36. Clearly, the exercise of one group of national rights 
discriminates against the other group of national rights. In the 
Irish-Italian scenario, whatever choice an Italian court could 
make would impair the rights granted by either Italy or Ireland. 
This dilemma highlights the need for the EC to settle the work-
for-hire conflict. 
III. RESOLVING THE WORK-FOR-HIRE CONFLICT 
Two possible solutions to the work-for-hire conflict exist under 
current EC law. The first solution would require the EC to har-
monize work-for-hire rules or, alternatively, moral right rules. 
254 See discussion supra part II.B. 
255 This conflict is analogous to the problem addressed in Huston v. La Cinq. Judgment 
of May 28,1991, Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive 
Library, Cassci File; see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. Because Huston pitted 
U.S. law against French law, however, article 36 was not at issue. 
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The second solution would require the EC to recognize com-
munity-wide use of a choice of law contract provision to indicate 
which Member State's law will govern the copyright in a work-
for-hire situation. To the extent the Member States would will-
ingly cede their individual cultural interests to the Community, 
either of these solutions could work. 
A. Harmonization 
Copyright harmonization offers the easiest solution to national 
law conflicts. Harmonization would ensure uniform treatment 
throughout the EC and would provide certainty to all parties to 
a copyright transaction. Uniform rules would ensure that parties 
know in advance to what extent, if any, Member State laws protect 
or impede their rights. As a result, parties would have more 
clearly defined bargaining positions. Consistent laws, therefore, 
would facilitate contracting since the parties would have a better 
idea of the value of their interests. 
Three articles in the Treaty of Rome (the Treaty) and the 
Single European Act (the SEA) authorize the European Council 
to harmonize national copyright laws.256 First, article 100 of the 
Treaty gives the Council the authority to issue directives that 
affect the establishment or functioning of the Common Market. 257 
Second, article 100A of the SEA permits the Council to take other 
measures intended to establish an internal market. 258 Third, ar-
ticle 235 gives the Council "the power and the duty to take the 
appropriate measures" in situations where the Community must 
act to attain one of its objectives in the common market's opera-
tion and the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers.259 
Although article 235 "would not be appropriate as regards har-
monization measures to complete the internal market for which 
[a]rticle 100A ... provides a specific legislative basis ... it could 
well be one of the powers to be used in dealing with problems 
256 See Green Paper, supra note 90, at 20 (discussing articles 100 and 235 of the Treaty 
and article 100A of the SEA). 
257 [d. Prior to the SEA, the Commission described this power as "the most likely basis 
for action at [the] Community level in the field of copyright law. It is a vital instrument 
for the harmonization of differing national laws and for creating a standard throughout 
the Community, even where some Member States have no laws governing the subjects at 
issue." [d. 
258 [d. "This provision permits such measures to be adopted by qualified majority." [d. 
259 [d. 
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for which harmonization alone may well not provide an adequate 
solution .... "260 These provisions clearly indicate that harmoni-
zation is feasible. 261 However, whether harmonization is desirable 
is an entirely different question. 
The cultural reasons behind the EC Member States' divergent 
work-for-hire rules undercut harmonization viability. In essence, 
the conflict pits the Dutch law and common law's economic in-
centives for public welfare enhancement and against the civil law 
view that creation alone begets "moral entitlement."262 On the 
one hand, the British, Irish, and Dutch approach mirrors "a 
utilitarian premise, holding out the prospect of economic reward 
as an incentive to investment in literary, musical and artistic 
works."263 On the other hand, the remaining EC countries follow 
"[t]he author's right tradition, which posits that authors deserve 
protection for their creation as an inherent natural right [and] 
centers on the author's right to control the exploitation of her 
work."264 A single EC work-for-hire rule implies a choice between 
these two views; because they are mutually exclusive, adoption of 
either view precludes adoption of the other. Given the relative 
merits of each system, it is unclear how the EC will decide the 
issue of where the burden should fall. 
Moreover, the possible benefits resulting from uniform work-
for-hire rules do not outweigh the likely costs harmonization 
would exact. In the work-for-hire context, consistency would re-
quire sacrifices by one block of countries or another. Either Brit-
ain, Ireland, and the Netherlands must abandon their "creator 
as author" exceptions, or the other nine Member States must 
relax their strict "creator as author" approach. A decision favor-
26°Id. at 22. 
261 Indeed, by December 1992, the Commission will have completed a study focusing 
on the differences in moral rights protection in the Member States. Smith, supra note 63, 
at 5. The study contemplates the possibility of future harmonization if the Commission 
believes that these differences distort trade. Id. In fact, there is an ongoing effort to 
harmonize at least minimal copyright protections in the EC in order to promote free 
trade. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights in the European Community, European File, Sept. 1991, at 4-5. The impediments on 
works-for-hire created by the various moral right regimes demonstrate how moral right 
can distort trade. 
262 LEAFFER, supra note I, at 2. 
263 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAw AND PRACTICE 685 (Little, Brown & 
Co. ed. 1989), reprinted in CREATION, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 63. 
264Id. 
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ing either approach would require the affected countries to adjust 
their national laws. 
Such an adjustment would face strong opposition in all coun-
tries. The French Supreme Court's refusal in Huston v. La Cinq265 
to derogate from French moral right exemplifies the extent to 
which Member States cling to their respective views. The Court 
stated that "the refusal to recognize, on the basis of a foreign law 
and on rights acquired in a foreign country, an author's right 
with respect to her work is manifestly incompatible with the 
French notion of public international order .... "266 The court's 
flat rejection of any notion contrary to the civil law concept of 
author's rights demonstrates a willingness to forego comity in 
favor of adhering to national cultural policy. Assuming the 
French position accurately reflects the relative positions of the 
other EC Member States, harmonization would compel affected 
countries to sacrifice highly prized national cultural values.267 It 
does not appear worthwhile for the EC to demand such a sacri-
fice. 
B. Choice of Law 
Adopting a Community-wide choice of law rule would also 
permit the EC to overcome disparate work-for-hire rules. This 
alternative would make conflict resolution a matter of private law. 
From the point of view of a work-for-hire copyright holder, a 
choice of law clause could guarantee unfettered exploitation of 
the subject work in the civil law countries. 
A work-for-hire copyright holder could use a choice of law 
clause in one of two ways.268 First, if the work's country of origin 
265 Judgment of May 28, 1991 (Huston v. La Cinq), Casso civ., 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-
19.522 (Fr.), available in LEXIS, Prive Library, Cassci File. 
266 [d. at *9 (translation by the author). 
267 Because Huston involved a conflict between U.S. law and French law, the French 
Supreme Court did not address an intra-EC problem. However, because harmonization 
would require France to abandon its strict author's rights regime if it tended toward a 
common law and Dutch resolution, rigorous opposition would arise. Indeed, this was the 
scenario that played out in Huston. See id. 
268 Other contexts exist as well. For example, successors-in-interest of an employer's 
work-for-hire copyright would be required to contract with the employer for a waiver of 
moral right and a choice of law provision. This article only addresses the relationship 
between creators of works and their employers. Because the common law work-for-hire 
rule vests employers with authorship status by virtue of the employment relationship, a 
contract is not essential. The choice of law option this article explores, however, requires 
an employer-employee contract for its application. 
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follows the common law work-for-hire approach, the employer-
copyright holder may contract with the employee-creator to apply 
the law of the country of origin. Second, if the work's country of 
origin does not follow the common law work-for-hire approach, 
the employer-copyright holder may contract with the employee-
creator to apply the law of one of the common law countries. 
While these two choice of law uses protect the copyright holder, 
other uses could protect the creator by applying the law of a strict 
civil law country. The ability of either employer or creator to 
secure a favorable choice of law provision depends on which party 
has the superior bargaining position. 
Because countries use moral right in order to equalize inher-
ently unfair bargaining positions,269 the choice of law option 
breaks down at the same point as harmonization. Although the 
common law countries may be more receptive to private choice 
of law clauses,27o civil law courts would most likely rule that such 
efforts violate public policy. 
Again, the Huston decision suggests how civil law courts would 
treat choice of law clauses favoring the common law work-for-
hire rule. Despite its recognition that the United States was the 
country of origin and that U.S. law should apply, the French 
Supreme Court stated that "only French law ... is able to deter-
mine whether the person claiming moral right is the author."271 
The court went on to reason that "to refuse a creator the exercise 
of her moral right ... is a result that contravenes the French 
conception of public order and of author's rights."272 Although 
the Huston Court did not address a choice of law clause, it did 
consider and reject the country of origin theory. The basis of its 
rejection was French public policy favoring author's rights. Be-
cause country of origin law would ordinarily apply, such law is 
analogous to the law parties to a contract could specify in a choice 
269 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
270 In determining the obligation under a contract, English courts apply the "proper 
law." If the parties state in a contract that the law of a given country will govern the 
contract or if this can clearly be inferred from the contract itself, the statement or intention 
will determine the proper law. The same law applies to all obligations under the contract 
unless specifically stated otherwise. Michael Flint, European Copyright Law and the Doctrine 
of Author's Rights, Address to the University of Southern California Entertainment Law 
Institute (April 27, 1991), reprinted in CREATION, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 63, 
at 25-26. 
271 Judgment of May 28, 1991, 1991 Bull. Civ., No. 89-19.522, available in LEXIS, 
Prive Library, Cas sci File, at *4 (translation by the author). 
272 [d. at *4-5 (translation by the author). 
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of law clause. Huston's rationale, therefore, suggests that no mat-
ter what law parties may choose, public policy will ultimately 
determine whether to accept or reject such a specification. Be-
cause each EC Member State's particular work-for-hire rule al-
ready reflects the State's public policy regarding moral right, a 
choice of law clause that contravenes a State's rule will most likely 
fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The desire to achieve an EC undivided by national barriers 
engenders an interest in unifying Member States' copyright laws. 
However, copyright's unique private and public character signif-
icantly hinders any easy solution to aligning national copyright 
laws. While these laws primarily protect interests private individ-
uals hold in their intellectual creations, they also reflect and fur-
ther significant national cultural policies. This latter aspect ex-
plains the work-for-hire schism between Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Luxem-
bourg, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
the Netherlands on the other. The civil law tradition embodies a 
choice to protect intellectual creators above and beyond the 
purely economic promise the common law tradition safeguards. 
In the work-for-hire context, culturally-bound interests drive 
both traditions, rather than economic schemes. Because these 
interests are primarily societal rather than economic, and because 
any resolution by way of harmonization or choice of law will force 
one group or the other to abandon its historical copyright ap-
proach, the EC should accept this conflict as one beyond the 
scope of its jurisdiction. 
